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IN MEMORIAM
On November 29, 2013  36-year-old York 
Regional Police Service Constable Michael 
Pegg  died as the result of complications from a 
training  accident he was involved in on 
November 12th, 2013.
Constable Pegg  was at the agency's training  facility in 
Vaughan when he broke his leg. He underwent surgery for 
the injury but remained hospitalized 
until succumbing to his injuries.
Constable Pegg  had served with the 
York Regional Police Service for 10 
years and was assigned to the Air 
Support Unit as a tactical flight officer.
On December 2, 2013 34-year-old Toronto Police Service 
Constable John Zivcic succumbed to injuries sustained two 
days earlier when he was involved in a vehicle crash at an 
intersection while responding to a call.
After the initial collision, his vehicle struck a  tree and he was 
ejected. He was transported to a local 
hospital where he remained until 
passing away.
Constable Zivcic  had served with the 
Toronto Police Service for six years. 
He is survived by his mother, brother, 
and sister.
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/
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“They	 Are	 Our	 Heroes.	 
We	 Shall	 Not	 Forget	 Them.”
inscription on Canada’s Police and Peace Officers’ Memorial, Ottawa
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Highlights In This Issue
Ulterior Motive Does Not Taint Otherwise Lawful 
Search
6
Aggravated HIV Assault Requires Realistic Possibility 
Of Transmission
9
Reason To Call Wife Not Articulated: No s. 10(b) 
Breach
11
Reasonable Suspicion Suffices For Dog Sniff 9
Experience: Reasonable Grounds Viewed Through 
Officer’s Lens
16
Warrant Must Specifically Authorize Computer 
Search
18
Odour Plus Provides Grounds For Arrest 23
No Restrictive Request Or Demand: Detention Did 
Not Crystallize
27
Target’s Own Words Provided Reasonable Suspicion: 
No Entrapment
31
Delay In Providing Counsel Justified: Circumstances 
Dire
33
Request An Invitation, Not a Demand: No Detention 36
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter. If you would like to be added to our 
electronic distribution subscribe at: www.10-8.ca  
Upcoming Events
Human	 Source	 Management
January	 21-24,	 2014
JIBC	 Police	 Academy	 Advanced	 Training
This course will equip participants with the basic skills 
required and the best practices to follow associated to 
the recruitment and handling of informants and agents. 
It includes preparation of judicial authorizations 
utilizing informant/agent information, as well as policy 
and how to effectively report on information delivered 
from these assets. 
www.jibc.ca/course/POLADV715 
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
see 
pages  
51-52
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice  Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Awaken your authentic leadership: lead with 
inner clarity and purpose.
Tana Heminsley; foreward by Mike Desjardins, 
Driver (CEO), ViRTUS.
Vancouver, BC: Authentic Leadership  Global, Inc., 
2013.
BF 637 L4 H45 2013
Basics of social research:  qualitative and 
quantitative approaches.
W. Lawrence Neuman and Karen Robson.
Toronto, ON: Pearson Canada, c2012.
HM 571 N49 2012  
Case study research: design and methods.
Robert K. Yin.
Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2014.
H 62 Y56 2014
Conflict management for managers: resolving 
workplace, client, and policy disputes.
Susan S. Raines.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2013.
HD 42 R35 2013
Justice Institute of BC (JIBC) [videorecording]
New Westminster, BC: Justice Institute of British 
Columbia, 2013.
1 videodisc (4 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
JIBC students, graduates and faculty share their 
perspectives on what makes attending  JIBC a unique 
post-secondary experience. The video showcases the 
breadth of justice and public safety education 
programs, academic credentials, and applied 
research supported by the Institute, all built on a 
foundation of hands-on, experiential learning.
LE 3 J88 J88 2013 D1560
Learning  for success: effective strategies for 
students.
Joan Fleet, Fiona Goodchild, Richard Zajchowski.
Toronto, ON: Nelson, c2006.
LB 1049 F48 2006
Learning journals: a handbook for reflective 
practice and professional development.
Jennifer A. Moon.
London, UK; New York, NY: Routledge, 2006.
LB 1060 M664 2006
Lessons from the virtual classroom: the realities 
of online teaching.
Rena M. Palloff and Keith Pratt.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2013.
LB 1044.87 P34 2013
Post-traumatic stress disorder and chronic health 
conditions.
by Steven S. Coughlin.
Washington, DC: American Public Health 
Association, c2012.
RC 552 P67 C67 2012
Ready! disaster survival for Canadians:  72 hours 
plus.
Sarah Jane Fraser.
Renfrew, ON: General Store Pub. House, 2013.
HV 551.5 C2 F73 2013
Research decisions: quantitative, qualitative, and 
mixed method approaches.
Ted Palys and Chris Atchison.
Toronto, ON: Nelson Education, 2013.
H 62 P34 2013 
Serial murderers and their victims.
Eric W. Hickey.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, c2013.
HV 6529 H53 2013
www.10-8.ca
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SENSE	 OF	 SMELL	 MAY	 BE	 USED	 
FOR	 GROUNDS
R. v. McNeil, 2013 NLCA 52
 
A police officer received source 
information on three separate 
occasions that the accused was 
transporting  marihuana. The officer 
considered the informant to be 
reliable, having  received information in the past that 
had been corroborated by positive  searches and 
arrests, including  the seizure of marijuana and 
cocaine. He had spoken to police 40+ times, had no 
criminal record and had been paid for information. 
On the first occasion, the source said the accused 
“was moving  marijuana in a pickup truck.” The 
officer located the accused and a passenger in a 
Dodge Ram pickup  truck, identified them but took 
no further action that day. Two weeks later the 
informant told police that the accused had brought 
out another “load of weed” the previous week. A 
CPIC search revealed the accused had been charged 
with a  simple possession offence under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. Then, four 
days later, the  informant again called police, stating 
the accused was on his way with a  load of 
marihuana. He also said that the accused “never 
moves less than two pounds.”
As a result of the recent information, police found 
the accused driving  a Dodge Ram crew cab pickup 
truck and pulled him over. He was the sole 
occupant. When the officers approached the driver’s 
side door, as soon as the window was opened, they 
instantly smelled the overwhelming  odour of fresh, 
unburned marijuana. The accused was immediately 
arrested, advised of his right to counsel, right to 
silence and was cautioned. A search of the accused 
revealed a quantity of money, a red cell phone and a 
silver coloured marijuana grinder. In the truck police 
found four mason jars containing  marihuana, a small 
bag  of marihuana in a tool box, a  hockey bag 
containing  four large plastic bags of marihuana and 
$2,200 in cash. In total, 3.15 pounds of marihuana 
was seized and the accused was charged with 
possessing it for the purpose of trafficking.
 
Newfoundland Provincial Court
 
The judge concluded there was no 
arbitrary  detention under s. 9 of the 
Charter. The police  relied on the 
informant's tip, which they had reason to 
consider reliable. Further, the  police  knew the 
accused and his vehicle from the earlier stop, and 
knew he had recently been charged with drug 
possession. They had also received information from 
a reliable  source on three occasions that he was 
moving  more than two pounds of marihuana at a 
time. When they  stopped the vehicle, they smelled 
the  overwhelming  odour of fresh, unburned, 
marijuana coming  from the truck. As well, the judge 
noted, “the smell of marijuana … provides the 
grounds necessary for the police  to believe that the 
occupant(s)  of the  vehicle from which the smell of 
marijuana emanates are or have been in possession 
of marijuana.” The accused was convicted of 
possessing  marihuana for the purpose of trafficking 
and sentenced to nine months imprisonment less 15 
days served on remand.
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The accused argued he had been 
arbitrarily stopped and detained by 
the  police  and the  search  of his 
vehicle violated his rights under s. 
8  of the  Charter. But Justice Welsh, delivering  the 
Court of Appeal’s opinion, disagreed. Here, the 
accused’s vehicle was stopped on the basis of the 
informant’s information, which the trial judge 
accepted as reliable. “The investigative  detention 
was short in duration,” said Justice Welsh. 
“The police officers reported an overwhelming  smell 
of marihuana emanating  from inside the vehicle. 
[The accused], who was the lone occupant, was 
immediately placed under arrest and advised of his 
constitutional rights. The  search  did not take place 
until after [the accused] was arrested. In these 
“[A] police officer may use his senses, including smell, as one element in determining the 
presence of grounds to proceed with an investigation.”
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circumstances, the investigative detention could not 
be said to be arbitrary.”
As for the  arrest, it was lawful. The informant's 
information was corroborated by other factors:
In particular, [the accused] was alone in the 
vehicle, the  police  reported the overwhelming 
smell of marihuana, they knew [the accused] 
and his vehicle from the [earlier] stop, and they 
knew he had earlier been charged with drug 
possession. It follows that there is no basis on 
which to conclude that the trial judge erred in 
determining  that [the accused’s] arrest and the 
consequent  search  did not infringe sections 8 
and 9 of the Charter. [para. 25]
On the issue of smell, the Court of Appeal noted 
“a police officer may use his senses, including  smell, 
as one element in determining  the presence of 
grounds to proceed with an investigation.” Here, 
“the smell was just one of many factors on which 
the  police  proceeded and was appropriately 
considered as such by the trial judge.”
The accused’s Charter rights were not infringed and 
his appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DEMAND	 MAKER	 IRRELEVANT
R. v. Wylie, 2013 ONCA 673
The police made a breath demand 
under s. 254(3)  of the Criminal Code. 
As a result, the accused provided 
two breath samples; 139 mg% and 
137 mg%.
Ontario Court of Justice
Both of the officers who were at the 
scene testified that a breath demand was 
made at 1:12 am but each testified that 
the other had actually made it. Despite 
uncertainty  of who made the demand, the judge 
ruled that there was ample evidence to conclude 
that a valid demand had been made. This evidence 
included two breath samples being  provided. Since 
a valid breath demand was made, the Crown could 
utilize s. 258(1)(c).  As a result, the accused was 
convicted of over 80 mg%.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
An appeal judge found the trial judge 
failed to determine who made the 
demand and a new trial was ordered. He 
ruled that the  details concerning  who 
gave the demand, what was said, and when and 
where the demand was made were necessary 
elements in determining  whether the Crown had 
proven a proper  demand. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
On further appeal by the Crown, 
the Court of Appeal restored the 
accused’s conviction. In its view, 
the Crown’s burden in proving  its 
case  did not include the details of the demand - who 
made it was irrelevant:
All that s. 254(3) requires is that a valid breath 
demand is made by a peace officer with 
reasonable grounds to do so and that the 
demand is made as soon as practicable. There is 
nothing in the Criminal Code or in the 
jurisprudence that supports the proposition that 
the Crown must prove the “who, what, where 
and when” of the demand. [para. 10]
It was open to the trial judge to find that a  valid 
demand had been made, bringing  the Crown’s case 
within the opening  words of s. 258(1)(c)  (“where 
samples of the breath of the accused have been 
taken pursuant to a demand made under subsection 
254(3)”). Furthermore, the accused complied with 
the demand which, absent a Charter challenge, 
provided a complete answer in the Crown’s favour.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“There is nothing in the Criminal Code or in the jurisprudence that supports the proposition 
that the Crown must prove the ‘who, what, where and when’ of the demand.”
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ULTERIOR	 MOTIVE	 DOES	 NOT	 
TAINT	 OTHERWISE	 LAWFUL	 
SEARCH
R. v. Chan, 2013 ABCA 385
At about 9:40 pm two patrol officers 
saw a truck parked in front of an 
apartment. They had month old 
information that the truck was 
possibly  armored and associated with 
the accused, a reputed gang  member known to carry 
weapons. After a computer search of the licence 
plate confirmed the information, the officers parked 
their vehicle so they could visually monitor the 
truck. A sergeant in charge of the gang  enforcement 
unit was contacted and a surveillance team was 
mobilized. At 10:43 pm, two unidentified people 
entered the truck; a male driver and a female 
passenger. When the truck went mobile, the 
surveillance team followed, observed it make an 
unsignalled lane change and reported the traffic 
infraction over the police radio. After the truck 
stopped, let out the female passenger and drove  on, 
the patrol officers pulled the vehicle over at 10:51 
hrs by  activating  their police  emergency lights. The 
accused stopped the truck near the curb, rolled his 
window down and waited in the vehicle. 
Fearing  the vehicle might be armoured and the 
driver armed, a “high-risk vehicle  stop” was 
initiated. Police  issued commands to the driver 
including  several directions to exit the vehicle. He 
refused and, following  a two to three  minute stand 
off, police were able to momentary divert his 
attention on the passenger side, approach the 
driver’s door, unlock it and grab his left arm and 
remove him from the truck. He was escorted to the 
police vehicle, advised he was being  detained for a 
traffic offence and asked to provide his driver’s 
licence. He said he did not have it and refused 
several times to identify  himself. He was arrested for 
obstruction and his truck was searched. When an 
officer bent forward to look under the seat using  his 
flashlight, he  saw part of a handgun stuffed under 
the seat. The handgun was a Kel Tec .32 calibre 
semi-automatic, loaded with six  live  rounds in the 
magazine  and one in the chamber. The accused was 
then arrested for possessing  a prohibited weapon, 
patted down and advised of his Charter rights at 
11:08 pm. On his person police located six cell 
phones, a  pager, $995 in cash and other items. The 
vehicle was searched the following  day under a 
warrant and found not to be armoured. But a 
machete, two hand axes, a hammer, and a blue bag 
containing  miscellaneous items of clothing  such as a 
balaclava, gloves and hats were found. The accused 
was charged with obstruction of justice, breach of 
recognizance and a number of weapons offences. 
No ticket for the traffic infraction was issued because 
it seemed insignificant in light of the subsequent 
events.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The gang  unit sergeant testified that if the 
accused was identified as an occupant of 
the truck the plan was to pull it over. If, 
however, the truck went mobile and the 
accused could not be identified as an occupant, it 
would be surveilled until there was reason to stop it. 
The officer who searched the truck testified that he 
searched it to ensure it was not stolen and to look for 
the accused’s driver’s licence, vehicle insurance and 
registration. The accused argued, in part, that the 
traffic stop  was a pretext to search the truck. In his 
view, the purpose of the stop  was not to enforce 
traffic laws or investigate traffic infractions but to 
determine the accuracy of the information police 
had about the vehicle and its association to the 
accused. And, even if there was some lawful basis 
for the stop, the accused contended that the search 
exceeded the scope as one incidental to arrest or to 
search for documentation (under the driver’s seat). 
The trial judge found the accused’s detention was 
not arbitrary. He had failed to signal a lane  change, 
which provided the “excuse” to justify the stop. 
However, the  search was unauthorized and 
unreasonable. A simple traffic stop  would not legally 
provide the police access to the vehicle  to determine 
whether it contained a firearm. The judge inferred 
that the police had “every intention to search this 
“[A]n officer’s ulterior motive to search is, 
at best, only a factor that does not render 
a lawful search unlawful.”
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vehicle in circumstances where a search warrant 
could not be  justified.” So although the obstruction 
arrest was valid, there  was no connection between 
that arrest and the search of the vehicle. The police 
knew the accused’s identity, had no safety concerns 
and there was nothing  to suggest that the truck  was 
stolen. So although there were no ss. 9 or 10 Charter 
breaches, the search was unreasonable under s. 8 
and the firearm was excluded as evidence under s. 
24(2). The judge found the police action was not 
inadvertent but a “calculated manoeuver designed to 
sidestep  the accused’s Charter rights.” He was 
acquitted of the weapons charges, but then pled 
guilty to obstruction and breach of recognizance (he 
was on bail for causing a disturbance). 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the trial 
judge’s rulings that the  police 
breached the accused’s s. 8 
Charter right and in excluding  the 
evidence from the vehicle under s. 24(2).
Unreasonable Search?
The Court of Appeal ruled the trial judge 
overemphasized the police plan to stop  and search 
the accused and his vehicle on any pretext. Rather 
than finding  the police were merely looking  for an 
excuse to search the truck, the court was required to 
consider the circumstances prevailing  at the time of 
the search. “An officer’s ulterior motive to search is, 
at best, only a factor that does not render a lawful 
search unlawful,” said the Court of Appeal. “Where 
a dual purpose search is undertaken, i ts 
reasonableness must be assessed on a step by step 
analysis of the interaction between police and the 
citizen. The ultimate question is whether, mindful of 
the circumstances as they develop, the police stayed 
within their authority.” By way of illustration, the 
Court of Appeal noted, “if the police had in fact 
decided to stop the [accused’s] vehicle and conduct 
an unlawful search, but before  they could do so they 
observed him to be trafficking  cocaine from the 
vehicle, the subsequent stop and search would be 
lawful no matter their impure thoughts.”
Here, the trial judge was concerned that the police 
had decided to stop and search the vehicle with or 
without legal justification. This pre-stop  concern led 
him to ignore the accused’s post-stop  conduct in 
finding  the search of the vehicle unconnected to the 
obstruction charge:  
The trial record reveals that although one of the 
gang  unit officers did express the intent to stop 
and search the truck with or without 
justification, there was no evidence that the 
uniformed officers who in fact stopped and 
searched the truck acted pursuant to such a plan, 
or were even aware of it. Indeed, the officers 
who stopped the truck testified that they were 
only told that the vehicle was of interest to the 
gang  unit because it was sometimes driven by 
the [accused] who was a suspected gang 
member and that the vehicle may be armoured 
and the [accused] armed. The officer who 
conducted the search said he did so only after 
the [accused] refused to identify himself and was 
being arrested for obstruction.
The trial judge seems to have entirely overlooked 
the [accused’s] conduct following the stop, and 
did not consider how that conduct and his 
subsequent arrest may have contributed to 
providing the police with lawful reason to search 
the truck.
The trial judge should have considered the 
[accused’s] conduct at the critical time 
immediately preceding the search, as well as the 
fact that the officers who conducted the search 
testified that they were not acting pursuant to an 
unlawful plan. Accordingly, we are left to 
question the validity of the conclusion that the 
search of the truck was unreasonable and 
amounted to a violation of the [accused’s] s 8 
Charter right. [paras. 29-31]
“Where a dual purpose search is 
undertaken, its reasonableness must be 
assessed on a step by step analysis of the 
interaction between police and the citizen. 
The ultimate question is whether, mindful 
of the circumstances as they develop, the 
police stayed within their authority.”
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Thus, there was no evidence that the  search that 
yielded the firearm was actually contaminated by 
the trial judge’s opinion that one or more of the 
officers were determined to search the vehicle with 
or without legal justification. In fact, the trial judge 
concluded that the police had executed a valid stop 
and made a lawful obstruction arrest. 
Exclusion of Evidence
Even assuming  that the search violated the accused’s 
s. 8  rights, the trial judge failed to consider a number 
of important factors in the s. 24(2)  analysis. Had he 
properly considered the relevant factors, his decision 
to exclude the evidence, particularly the handgun, 
may have been different. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittals were set aside and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
STRIP	 SEARCHES	 REQUIRE	 
INDIVIDUAL	 ASSESSMENT:	 CLASS	 
ACTION	 NOT	 CERTIFIED
Thorburn & Jacob v. British Columbia (Public 
Safety and Solicitor General), 
2013 BCCA 480
The plaintiffs, both students, were 
arrested on charges of mischief for 
peacefully protesting  outside the U.S. 
Consulate in Vancouver. They were 
taken to the city jail, patted down 
and subjected to an intrusive strip  search for 
contraband. A bail hearing  followed and they were 
released on an undertaking. The charges were  later 
stayed. 
The policy in the city jail at the time mandated 
routine strip  searches of all new arrivals except those 
arrested for (1)  intoxication in a public place (held in 
a “drunk tank” until sober) or (2)  a bylaw or traffic 
violation (held in a cell for expeditious process and 
release). Both these  groups were subjected to pat-
down searches only because there was no possibility 
of their being  admitted into the city  jail’s general 
prison population.
The plaintiffs sought to certify  a class action lawsuit 
against the Ministry of Public  Safety and the Solicitor 
General, the  City of Vancouver and the Vancouver 
Police Board seeking  damages under s. 24(1) of the 
Charter. Class action authorizes group litigation by 
allowing  a representative, on behalf of similarly-
situated individuals, to advance multiple claims for 
alleged wrong  doing  within a single action. They 
alleged s. 8 Charter  violations because persons not 
remanded into pre-trial custody at the city jail were 
subjected to routine strip searches. 
Supreme Court of British Columbia
The chambers judge dismissed the 
plaintiff's application for class action. She 
found the plaintiffs had failed to establish 
four of the five requirements necessary for 
class certification under British Columbia’s Class 
Proceedings Act, including  the need to establish 
common issues. In the judge’s view, “the legal test 
for determining  if there was a s. 8 Charter violation 
requires an individual analysis of the reasonable 
grounds (subjective and objective)  for each potential 
class member’s search.” This would require 
“individual assessments of the subjective beliefs of 
hundreds of employees who conducted the search 
during  the relevant period.” Thus, the chambers 
judge concluded the commonality requirement for 
class action certification, among  other requirements, 
had not been satisfied.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
On appeal by the plaintiffs, Justice 
Smith, authoring  the unanimous 
Court of Appeal's judgment, agreed 
with the chambers judge that the 
commonality requirement had not been established. 
“The requirement for a police officer to 
have reasonable grounds before arrest 
without a warrant protects the citizenry 
from arbitrary police conduct, while at 
the same time, protecting society from 
crime.”
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A strip  search is constitutionally valid if (1) there are 
reasonable grounds to arrest, (2)  reasonable grounds 
to justify the strip  search incidental to arrest and (3) 
the search is conducted in a reasonable manner. 
Here, the plaintiffs could not establish a cause of 
action by merely relying  on the claim that the strip 
search policy for all new arrivals was unreasonable. 
The reasonableness of each strip  search would 
require individual fact finding  and a legal analysis 
for each class member’s claim. This would 
necessitate individual trials: 
While a warrantless search is presumptively 
unreasonable, a Charter right is individual in 
nature. Individual assessments would be 
necessary to determine if reasonable grounds 
existed (based on the objectively-justifiable 
subjective belief of the arresting  officer or staff 
member conducting  the search) for the arrest 
and the search incidental to the arrest of each 
class member, and whether the manner of the 
sea rch was r ea sonab le in a l l o f t he 
circumstances unique to each proposed class 
member. ... [T]hose circumstances would 
include a consideration of the likelihood that a 
detainee might be remanded into custody and 
thereby be mingling  with the prison population. 
Each of these legal and factual determinations 
would require a consideration of the multifarious 
circumstances of each class member (e.g., the 
reason for the arrest, any prior criminal record or 
acts of violence and/or possession of weapons, 
and the extent of the possibility he or she might 
be remanded into custody). An unreasonable 
policy alone could not provide the foundation 
for determining  each class member would allow 
a judge to determine if a cause of action had 
been established. [para. 41]
So, although the common cause of action is an 
unlawful search, “each of the elements of the cause 
of action (reasonable grounds for arrest, search 
incidental to arrest, reasonableness of the manner of 
the search including  the  likelihood of a member 
being  placed into the prison population, and the 
appropriateness of Charter damages)  requires 
individual findings specific  to the proposed class 
member,” said Justice Smith. “In other words, a 
finding  of a s. 8 Charter violation as a result of an 
unreasonable search of one class member will not 
found a similar finding  for another class member as 
a finding  of an unreasonable search is dependent on 
a multitude of variable circumstances unique to 
each class member.” 
The plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
AGGRAVATED	 HIV	 ASSAULT	 
REQUIRES	 REALISTIC	 
POSSIBILITY	 OF	 TRANSMISSION
R. v. Bear, 2013 MBCA 96                     
 
The accused took items from a store 
a n d l e f t w i t h o u t p ay i n g  f o r 
them.  When a security  officer 
attempted to stop  him, he pushed her 
to the floor, fled and entered a 
bus.  The police were called, removed the accused 
from the bus and arrested him. During  police 
transport, the accused, knowing  he was HIV 
positive, made comments about HIV and spitting. As 
a precautionary measure, a spit sock was placed 
over his head. He had an open cut on his lip  and 
spots of blood on his shoes. He was placed alone in 
an interview room but managed to push up  his spit 
sock, even though handcuffed. He then hid near the 
door. When a police officer entered the room, the 
accused stepped out and spit in his face from about 
two feet away. The spit landed on the officer’s eye, 
nose, and forehead.  The officer was taken to the 
hospital, treated with post-exposure prophylactic 
drugs but showed no sign of having  contracted HIV. 
The accused was charged with aggravated assault.
“Individual assessments would be necessary to determine if reasonable grounds existed 
(based on the objectively-justifiable subjective belief of the arresting officer or staff 
member conducting the search) for the arrest and the search incidental to the arrest of 
each class member, and whether the manner of the search was reasonable in all of the 
circumstances unique to each proposed class member.”
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Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
A doctor testified that HIV was not 
transmitted casually. In his view, the 
possibility that HIV could be transferred 
through blood-tainted saliva, such as a 
splash of blood in an eye, could not be ruled out. 
He said it was theoretically possible that HIV virus 
particles in blood could be mixed with saliva and 
transmitted via  the “source” spitting  into another 
person’s eye, mouth or nose. But the doctor was not 
aware of this ever being  reported in the medical 
literature. 
The judge held that the  Crown had proven the mens 
rea of the offence but not the actus reus. Although 
the spitting  was an intentional act and the accused 
knew he had HIV, the Crown had not proven that his 
actions constituted a “significant risk of serious 
bodily harm.” There  was no evidence there was any 
blood in the spit that struck the officer. and the 
Crown had not established that the  risk of 
transmission was significant enough to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the officer’s life was 
endangered.  In the judge’s view, some risk or the 
fact that the  possibility of transmission could not be 
eliminated, was not proof of a significant risk. The 
judge also concluded that the  evidence did not 
prove an attempted aggravated assault. However, a 
conviction for common assault was entered. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the trial 
judge applied the incorrect legal 
test in determining  whether an 
aggravated assault had occurred 
and erred in determining  that the accused’s actions 
did not endanger the life of the officer.
Endangerment
 
The offence of aggravated assault requires at least, 
among  other things, that the life of the complainant 
was endangered. Unlike wounding, maiming  or 
disfiguring, which involve actual causing  of serious 
bodily harm, endangering  life may occur without 
any bodily harm actually occurring. In non-HIV 
cases, absent bodily harm, endangerment of life 
requires proof that the complainant’s life had been 
put in such danger that there was a risk  of 
death. However, in HIV cases, endangerment will be 
established if there is a significant risk of serious 
bodily injury through a  realistic possibility of HIV 
transmission. A realistic probability of transmission is 
not a high risk, but it must be  more than an 
extremely low or speculative risk. 
Here, the Court of Appeal found that if any blood 
was mixed with the saliva, the evidence established 
it was minimal. None of the store witnesses or 
arresting  officers noticed any facial cuts on the 
accused. The complainant noticed an open wound 
on the accused’s lip  but it was not running  with 
blood. The trial judge was entitled to infer that, if 
there  was blood in the saliva, the  amount of blood 
was insignificant and insufficient to prove a realistic 
possibility of transmission. Justice Steel stated:  
In this case, the HIV transmission is by way of 
blood mixed with saliva.  The evidence as to 
whether there was indeed blood mixed with the 
saliva is far from satisfactory.  However, even if 
one assumes there was some blood mixed with 
that spit, in order to find that the accused 
endangered the life of the police officer, there 
must be evidence of a real risk of HIV 
transmission or, in other words, a realistic 
possibility of transmission.  In my mind, those 
words produce a similar test.
There was no evidence adduced by the Crown 
that approached proof of such a risk.  Although 
[the doctor] said that transmission by way of 
blood-tainted saliva was possible, he equated 
possible with theoretical and also stated that 
such a case had never been reported in the 
medical literature.  His evidence was that the 
concerns centered on a situation where a large 
amount of visible blood (a blood splash) came 
into contact with the mucous membrane of the 
eye or nose.
BY THE BOOK:
Aggravated	 Assault: s. 268 Criminal Code
Every one commits an aggravated assault 
who wounds, maims, disfigures or 
endangers the life of the complainant.
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... [T]here was no evidence by which the Crown 
could prove that there was a realistic possibility 
of transmission and, therefore, that the police 
officer’s life was endangered.   Thus, the trial 
judge was correct in acquitting the accused of 
the charge of aggravated assault. [paras. 61-63]
Thus, the  officer’s life  was not put at risk of death 
when the HIV-positive accused spat at him, despite 
having  an open cut on his lip  and his saliva maybe 
entering  the mucous membrane of the officer’s eyes 
and/or nose.
Attempted Aggravated Assault
Under s. 660 of the Criminal Code a person may be 
convicted of an attempt where the complete 
commission of an offence is charged but not proved. 
“An accused is guilty  of an attempt if he intends to 
commit a crime and takes legally sufficient steps 
towards its commission,” said Justice  Steel. “Physical 
impossibility is not a defence to a charge of 
attempt. The crime of attempt consists of intent to 
commit the completed offence together with some 
act more than preparatory taken in furtherance of 
the attempt.” Thus, an attempt can be proven where 
the full offence actus reus is deficient because an 
attendant circumstance is lacking. 
In this case, the Court of Appeal found the Crown 
proved the mens rea:
[T]he accused intended to transmit HIV by 
spitting.   It is immaterial whether he thought his 
saliva alone was sufficient to do so or he thought 
that the blood from the cut on his lip mixed with 
his saliva was sufficient to do so.  It is immaterial 
that it was not a realistic possibility to transmit 
HIV in this way.  His spitting at the police officer 
coupled with his comments that he had HIV, his 
threats and his hiding behind the door of the 
interview room show a completed mens rea 
along with action that was more than 
preparatory.  The criminal element of attempt 
may lie solely in the intent. [para. 73]
Despite the Crown’s inability to prove endangerment 
of life (an element of the actus reus for the full 
offence), this was not fatal to a prosecution for 
attempted aggravated assault. The accused’s intent 
was clear and the conviction for attempted 
aggravated assault was substituted for the common 
assault conviction. The matter was sent back to the 
trial court for sentencing.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
REASON	 TO	 CALL	 WIFE	 NOT	 
ARTICULATED:	 
NO	 s.	 10(b)	 BREACH
R. v. Magalong,  2013 BCCA 478
A church pastor called police to 
report that the accused had been 
sexually inappropriate with three 
girls. He was an immigrant and not 
entirely  fluent in English. The pastor 
said the accused was suicidal and currently being 
driven by another person to the police detachment. 
An officer pulled the car over, advised the accused 
he was being  detained for sexual assault and took 
him to the detachment. However, the officer did not 
advise the accused of his s. 10(b)  Charter rights. He 
was placed in an interview room where he waited 
an hour and 45 minutes. A second officer entered 
the interview room, advised the accused he was 
charged with sexual assault and told him about his 
right to counsel. When she asked him if he 
understood, the accused said, “I understand.” When 
asked if he wanted to talk  to a lawyer he said he 
wanted to talk  to his wife. The officer refused this 
request, instead telling  him he had to decide if he 
wanted to call a lawyer. The accused said, “I don’t 
have a lawyer.” When asked if he would like to call 
a free  duty lawyer, the  accused said, “Yes ma’am” 
and a private call was facilitated. 
After the call concluded, the officer advised the 
accused he was also being  charged with sexual 
“An accused is guilty of an attempt if he intends to commit a crime and takes legally 
sufficient steps towards its commission. Physical impossibility is not a defence to a charge of 
attempt. The crime of attempt consists of intent to commit the completed offence together 
with some act more than preparatory taken in furtherance of the attempt.”
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interference and again advised him of his right to 
talk to a  lawyer. He spoke a second time to a  lawyer 
and, after the call, confirmed he understood what 
the lawyer told him. The officer then began an 
interview. Within 15 – 20 minutes another officer 
entered the interview room. He told the  accused he 
was under arrest “for sexual assault ... times three 
and sexual interference times two.” The charges 
were explained at some length and when asked 
whether it was clear” the accused replied in the 
affirmative. He acknowledged he had spoken to a 
lawyer, was satisfied with his call and understood he 
did not need to talk to the police  and that what was 
being  said was being  recorded and could be played 
before a judge in court. He then spoke  to police and 
was subsequently charged with several sex offences.
 
British Columbia Supreme Court
 
The Crown sought to use the accused’s 
statement to cross-examine him if he 
testified. During  a voir dire the  accused 
said he was just saying  “yes” in response 
to police questions about his right to remain silent 
and understanding  about a lawyer, “just to end it.” 
He said he would have liked to speak to a lawyer 
who spoke his first language and he did not 
understand that he had the right to contact another 
lawyer.  The trial judge found the police breached s. 
10(b) of the Charter by not promptly advising  him of 
his right to counsel. But his statement was admitted 
under s. 24(2). The judge rejected the accused’s s. 10
(b)  argument that the police failed to take  further 
steps to ensure he reasonably understood his right to 
counsel and by denying  him the opportunity to call 
his wife to arrange counsel of choice. The judge 
found the accused understood. He was readily  able 
to follow the conversations and was responsive to 
the questions asked of him. Without some indication 
by the accused that he did not understand, the  judge 
found there was no extended obligation on the 
police to do more to ensure understanding. As well, 
the accused had an obligation to articulate why he 
wanted to speak to his wife. Otherwise, there was no 
other way for the police to know that he was 
wanting  to speak to his wife  to arrange counsel. The 
accused did not testify. He was convicted by a jury 
on two counts of sexual interference (s. 151 Criminal 
Code) and two counts of invitation to sexual 
touching (s. 152 Criminal Code).
 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
 
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions, arguing  the trial judge 
erred, in part, by failing  to find the 
police breached his s. 10(b)  rights 
by not making  other reasonable efforts to explain his 
right to counsel. In his view, there were exceptional 
circumstances which should have alerted the police 
and obliged them to take further steps to reasonably 
ascertain that he understood his Charter  right to 
counsel. Furthermore, he contended that the police 
denied him an opportunity to talk to his wife to 
arrange counsel. He said the statement’s admission 
caused him not to testify. He wanted the guilty 
verdicts set aside and a new trial ordered.
 
Lack of Understanding?
 
A detainee’s understanding  of their  right to counsel 
is central to their ability to exercise it. In this case, 
Justice Saunders, writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment, found the trial judge did not err in ruling 
that the accused understood his right to counsel 
when he spoke with the police. In her view, there 
were no special circumstances that should have 
caused the police to take more steps to ensure he 
understood his rights. Whether an accused 
understands the police advice as to their Charter 
rights will depend on “whether there were objective 
indicia that should have alerted the police to this 
deficit of comprehension” or, in other words 
whether there were “special circumstances.” The 
Court of Appeal stated:
 
In the context of language issues, it will often be 
apparent that the detainee does not understand. 
In other circumstances, however, a detainee may 
have facility in English, but better facility in his 
or her first language. If that case is so, it still may 
be possible that a detainee understands the 
information provided, in which case there can 
be no complaint by the detainee he or she did 
not receive the mandatory Charter warnings in 
the language of his or her choice. Where, 
however, the detainee does not understand, a 
question arises whether the police should have 
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done more to ensure comprehension. I 
understand the jurisprudence … requires police 
to do more where there is, objectively, 
something  about the circumstances that 
positively indicate a lack of comprehension. 
[para. 28]
 
The accused submitted the police did not do enough 
to ensure he understood his rights. There were 
special circumstances (or objective indicia) that 
should have alerted the officers he  lacked 
comprehension about his rights. These objective 
indicia included:
• his lack of ease in the English language
• police knew English was not his first language
• he had a thick accent
• the police had trouble understanding him. 
In his view, the police were required to do more and 
have him repeat back his understanding  of his rights 
(to confirm his comprehension)  and ask him whether 
he required an interpreter. 
 
But here, Justice Saunders agreed with the trial 
judge’s conclusion that the accused did not lack the 
understanding  of his rights based on the questions 
he was asked and the nature of his answers. “The 
answers appear responsive to the questions asked 
and do not demonstrate an inability to follow the 
conversation,” she said. During  the exchange with 
police, the accused demonstrated an ability to 
express himself both when he didn’t understand 
something and to affirm when he did understand.
 
Third Party Phone Call?
   
The police also did not breach the accused’s rights 
when they denied his request to speak to his wife. 
“[He] did not tell the police that he wanted to 
contact his wife to ask her to contact counsel for 
him,” said Justice Saunders. “In these circumstances, 
denying  [the accused’s] single simple request to 
contact his wife  does not establish a Charter 
violation.”
 
The trial judge correctly applied the law and the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Relying	 on	 R.	 v.	 K.W.J.,	 2012	 NWTCA	 3
In Magalong, the reasoning  of the Northwest 
Territories Court of Appeal in R. v. K.W.J., 2012 
NWTCA 3 was adopted. In K.W.J., as in Magalong, 
the accused asked to speak to his wife but did not 
tell the police why. He successfully argued at trial 
that his s. 10(b)  right was breached when he was 
denied this opportunity. He claimed he wanted to 
contact his wife to help  him exercise his right to 
counsel. The Appeal Court, however, concluded the 
trial judge erred in finding  a Charter breach. 
Although “a detainee is permitted, as part of the 
exercise of a right to counsel, to communicate with 
a third party so long  as the purpose is to retain or 
instruct counsel and there are no investigative 
concerns arising  from the request,” it did “not fall to 
the police to speculate on the reason why the 
[accused] wanted to contact his wife, unless there 
are special circumstances that require them to make 
inquiries.” In this case, the reason for contacting  his 
wife was not obvious nor was there special 
circumstances obliging  the police to clarify the 
purpose:
 
[The accused] made only one request to speak to his 
wife,  and  did not specify that  he required her 
assistance to obtain a lawyer. We question whether it 
was obvious in the circumstances that the [accused] 
wanted  to contact  his wife for the purpose of 
exercising  his right to counsel, particularly as  the 
officer testified that he would  have allowed the 
[accused] to contact his wife had he known that was 
the reason.
 
In our view,  a simple request to contact his wife, 
without more, does not give rise to the inference that 
the request was to assist in exercising  the [accused’s] 
right to counsel. It is  not unusual for a detained 
individual to want to contact family members when 
provided with access to a telephone, and there may 
be many instances where the police investigation 
would be compromised  by a l lowing  such 
communication. Indeed, that  may have been the case 
here, where the charge was sexual assault of the wife’s 
underage niece.
 
We also find that there were no special circumstances 
that gave rise to additional obligations on the part of 
the police officers to clarify  the purpose behind  the 
[accused’s] request. He was a mature man, and he did 
not objectively present as having  any physical or 
mental impairment that suggested  he required 
additional  assistance on the manner in which to 
exercise his right to counsel. In our opinion, he failed 
to diligently pursue his right to counsel by not 
explaining  the reason why he wanted to speak with 
his wife. [paras. 34-36] 
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ABSORPTION	 RATE	 BEYOND	 
KNOWLEDGE	 OF	 ORDINARY	 
PERSON
R. v. Benoit, 2013 NLCA 3
Acting  on an anonymous tip, police 
apprehended the accused at his 
worksite  standing  beside a truck. A 
police officer smelled a  faint odor of 
alcohol from the accused and saw that 
his eyes were watery. However, he had normal 
speech and gait, his eyes were  not red and his tire 
tracks along  the road were consistent with normal 
driving.  The accused failed a roadside breath test 
and a s. 254(3) Criminal Code demand was made. 
Two breath samples of 150 mg% were later provided 
at the police station. The accused told police he had 
consumed 2 ½ bottles of beer and a drink of vodka. 
He was charged with over 80 mg%.
Newfoundland Provincial Court
The accused testified he drank one beer at 
home and the remaining  beer at a birthday 
party  he  attended on his way to work. He 
said he received two “little” bottles of 
vodka from the party  hostess to take with him, which 
he drank when he arrived at work. The party hostess 
testified the accused drank beer at the party and that 
she had gifted him two little bottles of vodka. The 
certificate of analysis showing  the breathalyzer test 
results was admitted. Although this presumptively 
established a 150 mg% BAC at the time of driving, 
the judge held that the accused had rebutted the 
presumption. The testimony of the accused and the 
party hostess, along  with the police officer’s 
observations of the  accused and the tire tracks his 
truck made in the snow, raised a reasonable doubt 
that his BAC exceeded 80 mg%. The accused was 
acquitted.
Newfoundland Supreme Court
A Crown appeal was unsuccessful. The 
appeal judge opined that expert 
evidence is not always required to rebut 
the presumption under s. 258(1)(d.1)  of 
the Criminal Code. Here, the trial judge reviewed 
the relevant evidence (normal speech and gait, eyes 
not red and truck tire tracks consistent with normal 
driving). Plus, the trial judge found the accused had 
consumed just over two beers earlier in the evening 
before driving  and then consumed two small bottles 
of vodka after driving. The appeal judge concluded 
that the trial judge made no legal error in her 
interpretation and application of s. 258(1)(d.1). She 
detailed the basis for her reasonable doubt and 
determined the Crown had failed to prove all the 
essential elements of the offence.
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
Section 258(1)(d.1) outlines the 
evidentiary requirements for an 
accused seeking  to challenge the 
presumptive proof of  breathalyzer 
certificate evidence on the basis of their post-driving 
alcohol consumption. Justice Hoegg, speaking  for 
the Court of Appeal, said this:
Section 258(1)(d.1) provides that a person who 
consumes alcohol after relinquishing  care and 
control of his or her vehicle but before taking 
breathalyzer tests can still raise a reasonable 
doubt about the breathalyzer test results 
accurately reflecting the accused’s blood alcohol 
levels at the time of driving, but in order to do 
so, he or she must meet the two evidentiary 
criteria set out in the section. [para. 17]
And further:
Section 258(1)(d.1) requires an accused to show 
that what he or she says about his or her 
consumption of alcohol, both before and after 
driving, tends to be consistent with: 1) his or her 
being under the legal limit when he or she 
drove, and 2) with his or her test results. A trial 
judge necessarily has to advert to the evidence 
and find that it establishes both of these 
consistencies before he or she can find that the 
presumptive proof of the certificate evidence is 
rebutted. The type of evidence the trial judge 
needs in order to determine the two 
consistencies, will, as a practical necessity, 
come from an expert, for an ordinary person is 
not able to say whether the quantity of alcohol 
an accused says he or she consumed, both 
before and after driving, is consistent with that 
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accused’s blood alcohol level not exceeding .08 
when driving and consistent with his or her 
breathalyzer test results. An ordinary person is 
simply not possessed of the skills, knowledge 
and tools necessary to give evidence which 
addresses the absorption rate of alcohol an 
accused says he consumed. [para. 21]
Thus, to rebut the presumption, the accused must 
show his alcohol consumption was consistent with 
both his BAC being  under 80 mg% when he was 
driving  and his breathalyzer test results. But just 
what kind of evidence will suffice?
The only trial evidence pertaining  to the accused’s 
BAC was the certificate of analysis, which 
presumptively proved his BAC was over 80 mg%:
Certificate evidence is expert evidence, provided 
to a court by trained technicians, usually police 
officers, using  scientifically designed machinery 
and scientific techniques that explain the rate of 
absorption of alcohol in an accused’s blood 
between the time when an offence was allegedly 
committed and the time of the breathalyzer tests. 
This type of evidence is beyond the ken of 
ordinary witnesses and fact-finders. An ordinary 
person may well be able to speak to his or her 
observations of an accused’s behaviours, like 
unsteady gait, slurred speech, erratic driving, etc. 
which are so commonly known to be associated 
with impairment by alcohol or drugs that his or 
her evidence could be used to support a charge 
of impaired driving, but such evidence does not 
say anything about the concentration of alcohol 
in that accused’s blood. [para. 20]
In this case, the accused did not satisfy the burden in 
rebutting  the presumption. He did not call evidence 
to cast doubt on the reliability of the breathalyzer 
certificate. There was no evidence that tended to 
show the accused’s BAC was under 80 mg% when 
he drove. Nor was there evidence that the  amount of 
alcohol he said he consumed was consistent with 
his test results. There was nothing  said as to his 
alcohol absorption rate. This was necessary for the 
trial judge to determine whether the accused’s 
alcohol consumption before driving  (2 ½ beers) was 
consistent with a BAC under 80 mg% at the time of 
driving  and whether his total alcohol consumption 
(2 ½ beers + 2 small bottles of vodka)  was consistent 
with his breathalyzer test results (150 mg%). The 
evidence of normal speech upon arrest and straight 
tire tracks made in the snow said nothing  about his 
BAC while driving  or after breath samples were 
taken. ”Use of evidence about an accused’s physical 
presentation and manner of driving  to support the 
requirements of the section would be pure 
speculation,” said Justice Hoegg. The presumption of 
the certificate evidence was not rebutted. The 
Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered, allowing  the accused an opportunity  to 
adduce expert evidence if he so chooses.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
Presumption	 of	 Identity: s. 258 Criminal Code
s.  258  (1) In any proceedings under subsection 
255(1)  in respect of an offence committed 
under section 253  or subsection 254(5) or in 
any proceedings under any of subsections 255
(2) to (3.2),
(d.1) if samples of the accused’s breath or a sample of the 
accused’s blood  have been taken as described in paragraph 
(c) or (d) under the conditions described in that paragraph 
and  the results of the analyses show a concentration of 
alcohol  in blood  exceeding 80 mg  of alcohol in 100 mL of 
blood,  evidence of the results of  the analyses is proof that 
the concentration of alcohol  in the accused’s blood at the 
time when the offence was alleged to have been 
committed  exceeded 80 mg  of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, 
in the absence of evidence tending  to show that  the 
accused’s consumption of alcohol was consistent with both
(i) a concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood that 
did  not exceed  80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood  at 
the time when the offence was alleged to have been 
committed, and
(ii) the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood  as 
determined under paragraph (c) or (d), as the case may 
be,  at the time when the sample or samples were taken
[.]
... ... ...
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EXPERIENCE:	 REASONABLE	 
GROUNDS	 VIEWED	 THROUGH	 
OFFICER’S	 LENS
R. v. Messina, 2013 BCCA 499
Members of the plain clothes Crime 
Reduction Unit (CRU)  saw the 
accused meet four people at four 
different locations in about an hour. 
These  four people approached the 
accused’s car on foot, briefly entered his vehicle, 
exited and then immediately left the area. These 
encounters included:
1. A police officer saw a disheveled man standing  on 
the sidewalk smoking  a cigarette and looking  left 
and right. The officer observed the accused drive 
up  very slowly and stop in front of the man. The 
man got into the passenger side of the car, it 
circled the  block and then the man left the vehicle 
and walked into an alley. The officer believed 
what he  saw was consistent with his experience 
dealing  with dial-a-dope operations. He had 
investigated 20 to 30 suspected drug  trafficking 
incidents, 10 of which led to arrests for dial-a-
dope trafficking. As a result, the  CRU supervisor 
authorized surveillance. She was a 17 year police 
veteran with extensive experience with drug 
addicts, dial-a-dope traffickers, surveillance 
projects and street level drug sales.
2. The accused, after driving  to a gas station and 
talking  on his cell phone, drove to a  location 
where  a “skinny” female got into his car. She 
came from and returned to what was described as 
looking  like  a “crack shack.” The officer 
concluded that the woman’s thin build supported 
an inference that she was a drug user.
3. The accused picked up  a male and dropped him 
off at a McDonald’s nearby. 
4. The accused then drove to another location where 
a man entered the car briefly and then left.
Based on his own observations, the observations 
communicated by other CRU members and a 
discussion with his supervisor, the officer decided to 
arrest the accused. He was taken to the police 
detachment where a  strip  search yielded two rocks 
of crack cocaine totalling 0.5 grams.
British Columbia Provincial Court
Both the police officer and the CRU 
supervisor testified that the meetings 
between the accused and the four people 
were p re -a r ranged. Each per son 
approached on foot, entered the passenger seat of 
the car, sat in the car for 30-60 seconds, then exited 
the car and immediately left the area. Despite both 
officers independently  forming  reasonable grounds 
for the arrest, the judge relied only on the arresting 
officer’s testimony and found a s. 9 Charter breach. 
In the judge’s view, the arrest lacked the  necessary 
reasonable grounds. The judge concluded that the 
arresting  officer “was operating  from behind lenses 
which cast everything  he saw in the light of being 
connected to a dial-a-dope operation.” Further, he 
found the officer’s mindset was such that only 
inferences supporting  guilt were entertained. “The 
grounds here did not add up to the critical mass 
necessary to elevate them to reasonable and 
probable grounds for arrest,” said the judge. “The 
evidence was sufficient to provide the  officers with a 
reasonable suspicion but otherwise  amounted to 
little  more than ‘acting  on a hunch based on 
intuition and experience’.” Since there were 
insufficient grounds to justify  the arrest, the strip 
search was unreasonable. The evidence, however, 
was admitted under s. 24(2)  and the accused was 
convicted of possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in admitting  the 
evidence under s. 24(2). The 
Crown, on the other hand, 
contended that the  arrest was lawful under s. 495(1) 
of the Criminal Code. And, even if the arrest was not 
lawful, the Crown submitted the evidence was 
properly admitted. 
Justice Stromberg-Stein, delivering  the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment, agreed with the Crown, finding 
the accused was not unlawfully arrested and the 
search incidental to arrest lawful. 
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The Arrest
Under s. 495(1)  of the Criminal Code a police officer 
may arrest without a warrant a person they have 
reasonable grounds to believe has committed an 
indictable offence. Determining  the existence of 
reasonable grounds requires a two-part test:
The first step requires the arresting officer to 
have a subjective, personal belief that there are 
reasonable grounds for the arrest. The second 
part requires objective justification for the 
officer’s subjective belief. In assessing objective 
justification, the consideration is whether a 
reasonable person, “standing  in the shoes of the 
police officer, would have believed that 
reasonable and probable grounds existed to 
make the arrest.” The test requires reasonable 
probability or reasonable belief and not proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. [reference omitted, 
para. 20]
An officer’s experience can be included in assessing 
the objective grounds for arrest:
[The case law] authorities leave no doubt that 
[the arresting  officer’s] interpretation of [the 
accused’s] actions must be considered in light of 
his experience and training  as a police officer 
and a CRU officer. This is what the Crown refers 
to as the “experience factor’’, which requires 
that an officer’s reasons for arrest be assessed 
from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable 
and caut ious pol ice of f icer, s imi lar ly 
experienced as the arresting officer, rather than 
an untrained civilian. [para. 24]
Furthermore, the CRU supervisor had relevant 
extensive experience and made observations that 
were completely ignored by the trial judge. She too 
had independently  formed reasonable grounds to 
arrest the accused:
Both [officers] have specialized skill and training 
that the trial judge failed to take into account 
when deciding  whether there were objectively 
valid grounds for arresting  [the accused]. These 
were experienced officers who had been 
involved in numerous drug  investigations. Their 
observations, considered in their totality, were 
sufficient to support objectively reasonable 
grounds that [the accused] was engaged in drug 
dealing. They did not have to rule out all other 
possible innocent explanations for [the 
accused’s] conduct or each event. They were 
entitled to use their training  and experience to 
conclude from the totality of their observations 
that [the accused] was trafficking in drugs from 
his car. [para. 26]
In this case, the trial judge failed to assess objective 
reasonableness by not considering  the proper test: 
reasonable person “standing  in the shoes” of the 
arresting  officer and the CRU supervisor.  “The trial 
judge adopted a layperson’s view of what an 
experienced officer would deduce in the 
circumstances, focusing  on the officer’s subjective 
belief, when her task was to consider whether there 
was an objective basis for the officers’ subjective 
belief,” said Justice Stromberg-Stein. “In my view, 
the observations made of [the accused’s] actions, 
when considered having  regard to the experience of 
the officers involved, objectively support the 
officers’ belief in the existence of reasonable 
grounds.”
The arrest was lawful and search that yielded the 
evidence was reasonable having  been obtained 
incidental to the  arrest. Since  there were  no Charter 
breaches, s. 24(2) not engaged. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed and his conviction upheld. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
“In assessing objective justification, the consideration is whether a reasonable person, 
‘standing in the shoes of the police officer, would have believed that reasonable and 
probable grounds existed to make the arrest.’ The test requires reasonable probability 
or reasonable belief and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
“[The police] were entitled to use their 
training and experience to conclude from 
the totality of their observations that [the 
accused] was trafficking in drugs from his 
car.”
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WARRANT	 MUST	 SPECIFICALLY	 
AUTHORIZE	 COMPUTER	 SEARCH
R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60 
After receiving  a report from B.C. 
Hydro that electricity was being 
diverted and not paid for, police 
obtained a warrant under s. 487 of 
the Criminal Code.  The warrant 
authorized the police to search not only for 
equipment used to divert electricity but also for 
“documentation identifying  ownership and/or 
occupancy” relevant to the investigation of the 
electricity theft. When the police executed the 
warrant they found a  marihuana grow-operation in 
the basement and an electrical bypass. They also 
found two computers and a cellular telephone in the 
living  room. One computer (a desk top) was 
connected to a security video camera monitoring 
and recording  the front of the residence. Footage in 
this computer showed a  black Honda CRV in the 
driveway; the  accused owned a 2007 black  Honda 
CRV. The second computer (a laptop) was actively 
running  MSN Messenger (an on-line chat) and had 
Facebook (a social networking  service)  open, both 
using  the  name of the accused. Using  the laptop’s 
search tools, police located a resumé under the 
accused’s name (and took a photo of it). The cellular 
telephone was also examined and a photograph, 
believed to be the accused, was found in it. Both 
computers and the cellular telephone were  seized, 
removed from the residence and examined 
further. The accused was charged with production of 
marihuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking 
and theft of electricity.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge held that the ITO did not 
support reasonable grounds to believe 
that documentation showing  ownership 
and/or occupancy of the residence would 
be found inside the premises. The officer did not say 
he believed this to be so nor were there any facts to 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
The Experience Factor
“Officer training and experience can 
play an important role in assessing 
whether the reasonable suspicion 
standard has been met.  Police 
officers are trained to detect criminal activity.   That is 
their job.  They do it every day.  And because of that, “a 
fact or consideration which might have no significance 
to a lay person can sometimes be quite consequential 
in the hands of the police”.  - Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
McKenzie, 2013 SCC 50 at para. 62
[T]his Court has consistently held that an arresting 
officer’s personal experience is relevant to whether the 
officer’s subjective belief in grounds to arrest is 
objectively justified.” - British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Wilson, 
2012 BCCA 517 at para. 21, leave to appeal ref’d [2013] SCCA No. 71 .
“[A] judge is entitled to consider a police officer’s 
training and experience in determining objective 
reasonableness. What may appear to be innocent 
objects to the general public may have a very different 
meaning to an officer experienced in drug operations.” 
- Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Rajaratnam, 2006 ABCA 333 at para. 25.
“Being ‘placed in the position of the officer’ does not just 
mean making the same observations as the officer, as 
to many lay people such observations would be 
meaningless. Included in the assessment of whether 
the grounds for arrest are reasonable is the officer’s 
experience, training and knowledge.” - British Columbia Court of 
Appeal in R. v. Luong, 2010 BCCA 158 at para. 19.
“[N]otwithstanding that each of those factors standing 
alone can be consistent with non-criminal activity, 
their combined effect, when viewed through the lens 
of a police officer’s experience, cannot be ignored.” - 
British Columbia Court of Appeal  in R. v. Ashby, 2013 BCCA 334 at para. 57
...	 ...	 ...
...	 ...	 ...
...	 ...	 ...
!!!"#$%&"'(
)
*+,-./0&0122-/03
4-,567-8-290:$$&
1;%<=>*1?=0@=A7@0>B7C0D=<D
!"#$ %&'$ (#)*+,#-$ .#/01$
2304$ !#56$ +5$ 0$ 5+781#$
7916+81#$ ,"3+,#$ :9+;$
4#5+/'#4$63$,"011#'/#$<39)$
9'4#)560'4+'/$ 3=$ 6"#$ 10>?$
@0,"$:9#56+3'$+5$A05#4$3'$0$,05#$=#069)#4$+'$6"+5$+559#?$
(##$80/#$BB$=3)$6"#$0'5>#)5?
C?$D11$3,,980'65$3=$0$*#"+,1#$0)#$8)#59786+*#1<$4#60+'#4$
>"#'$6"#$*#"+,1#$+5$56388#4$=3)$0$6)0==+,$*+3106+3'E
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
$
I?$D5J+'/$0$4)+*#)$63$A13>$+'63$0'$3==+,#)K5$=0,#$=3)$6"#$
89)835#$ 3=$ 4#6#)7+'+'/$ 6"#$ 539),#$ 3=$ 0'$ 01,3"31$
3439)$+5$0$8#)7+55+A1#$5,)##'+'/$6#,"'+:9#$0'4$43#5$
'36$#'/0/#$6"#$)+/"6$63$,39'5#1$9'4#)$5?CLFAG$3=$6"#$$
M"0)6#)?
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
$
B?$ N"+,"$ 8)3*+',#$ "04$ 6"#$ 7356$ 088#015$ A#=3)#$ 6"#$
(98)#7#$M39)6$3=$M0'040$+'$ILLOE$$
$ F0G$P)+6+5"$M3197A+0Q$
$ FAG$D1A#)60Q
$ F,G$R'60)+3Q
$ F4G$S9#A#,?
T?$!"#$+'=3)706+3'01$496<$+7835#4$3'$6"#$831+,#$9'4#)$
5?CLFAG$3=$6"#$M"0)6#)$+5$63$/+*#$6"#$4#60+'#4$8#)53'$
'36+,#$ 3=$ 6"#+)$ )+/"65U$ '36$ 63$ 6#11$ 6"#7$ "3>$ 63$
#V#),+5#$6"#7?$
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
W?$D$831+,#$3==+,#)$'##4$'36$70J#$0$5?IWTFIG$M)+7+'01$
M34#$ 088)3*#4$ 5,)##'+'/$ 4#*+,#$ 4#70'4$
+'560'60'#3951<$983'$4+5,3*#)+'/$6"06$6"#$4)+*#)$"05$
01,3"31$ +'$ 6"#+)$ A34<U$ A96$ 5"3914$ 43$ 53$ 8)37861<$
0=6#)$6"#$)#:9+5+6#$5958+,+3'$+5$=3)7#4?$
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
X?$ N"+,"$ 3=$ 6"#$ =3113>+'/$ >05$ 6"#$ 7356$ =)#:9#'6$
3==#',#$+'$04916$,)+7+'01$,39)6$+'$ILLXYILLOE
$$$$F0G$+780+)#4$4)+*+'/Q$
$ FAG$6"#=6Q
$ F,G$=)094Q
$ F4G$A)#0,"$3=$8)3A06+3'Q
$ F#G$4)9/$8355#55+3'?
!"#$!!%&'("$)*+#,
!"#$%&'()#'%*+,-.'-/+0#)*1)&1
23$-+#&')4+5"16-+$)7+#%+8%*7'1-&+/$-#$-&+#$-&-+
'7+7"99'8'-*#+ &-4'):4-+ '*9%&;)#'%*+%*+ #$-+:)7'7+
%9+ /$'8$+ #$-+ )"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+ 8%"41+ $).-+
6&)*#-1+#$-+)"#$%&'()#'%*<+
3$-+)"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+;"7#+:-+7)#'79'-1+#$)#+
#$-&-+)&-+&-)7%*):4-+)*1+=&%:):4-+6&%"*17+#%+:-4'-.-+#$)#+)*+
%99-*8-+$)7+:--*>+'7+:-'*6>+%&+'7+):%"#+#%+:-+8%;;'##-1>+)*1+
#$)#+ #$-+ )"#$%&'()#'%*+ 7%"6$#+ /'44+ )99%&1+ -.'1-*8-+ %9+ #$)#+
%99-*8-<+?%/-.-&>+#$-+#&')4+5"16-+1%-7+*%#+7#)*1+'*+#$-+7$%-7+
%9+ #$-+ )"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+ /$-*+ 8%*1"8#'*6+ #$-+ &-.'-/<+ 3$-+
@"-7#'%*+9%&+#$-+#&')4+5"16-+'7+/$-#$-&+#$-&-+/)7+)*A+:)7'7+%*+
/$'8$+ #$-+ )"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+ 8%"41+ $).-+ 6&)*#-1+ #$-+
)"#$%&'()#'%*<+
3$-+#&')4+5"16-+7$%"41+%*4A+7-#+)7'1-+)*+)"#$%&'()#'%*+'9+7)#'79'-1+
%*+)44+#$-+;)#-&')4+=&-7-*#-1>+)*1+%*+8%*7'1-&'*6+B#$-+#%#)4'#A+
%9+#$-+8'&8";7#)*8-7C>+ #$)#+#$-&-+/)7+*%+:)7'7+%*+/$'8$+#$-+
)"#$%&'()#'%*+8%"41+:-+7"7#)'*-1<++3$-+#&')4+5"16-C7+9"*8#'%*+'7+
#%+ -D);'*-+ #$-+ 7"==%&#'*6+ )99'1).'#+ )7+ )+ /$%4->+ )*1+ *%#+ #%+
7":5-8#+'#+#%+)+B;'8&%78%='8+)*)4A7'7<CE+F+G&'#'7$+H%4";:')+H%"&#+
%9+!==-)4+H$'-9+I"7#'8-+J'*8$>+!"#$"#%&&#'()#*'+,#KLLM+GHH!+
KNL>+)#+=)&)7<+OKFON>+&-9-&-*8-7+%;'##-1<+
'-$)"+&.$.%&'%+/012"&
3$.4'*5"&-"$/&60$42$7&
81+9"0"+8"
1:;<=>?&@ABC&DEEF
!"#$ (#*#'6"$ Z3)6"$ D7#)+,0'$ M3'=#)#',#$ 3'$ ("0J#'$
P0A<$(<'4)37#YDA95+*#$[#04$!)0970$+5$A#+'/$"#14$3'$
R,63A#)$ W\OU$ ILL]$ +'$ A#096+=91$ ^0',39*#)U$ P)+6+5"$
M3197A+0?$!"+5$<#0)U$3*#)$CLL$58#,+01+;#4$#V8#)65$>+11$
A#$8)#5#'6+'/$=)37$0)39'4$6"#$>3)14U$+',194+'/$0$56)3'/$
1#/01$6)0,J?$
EEF?0>/2GH/I92EE$_)#*#'6$("0J#'$P0A<$(<'4)37#$PM$
"05$ 0))0'/#4$ 0$ /)398$ )06#$ )#49,6+3'$ =3)$ 011$ PM$
8)3=#55+3'015$ 0'4$ 80)#'65?$ !"#$ /)398$ )06#$ =3)$ PM$
066#'4##5$+5$3'1<$`CWL$a(b$=3)$6"#$=911$6")##$40<5$3=$
6)0+'+'/?$$N"#'$)#/+56#)+'/U$9'4#)$c)398$M34#$#'6#)$PM$
c)398$206#$63$)#,#+*#$6"#$4+5,39'6#4$)06#?$
H3)$ 73)#$ +'=3)706+3'$ 81#05#$ *+5+6$
GGGHI<J;KLMN>H<?OP:<JQ>?>J:>DEEF
www.10-8.c
Volume 13 Issue 6 - November/December 2013
PAGE 19
support such a belief. Nor did the judge accept that 
the justice of the peace could have inferred that 
documents evincing  ownership or occupation would 
be found in the residence. The trial judge also ruled 
that the police  were not authorized to search the 
computers and cellular telephone, holding  those 
searches to be unreasonable.  “It is no longer 
conceivable that a search warrant for a residence 
could implicitly authorize the search of a  computer 
(or a cellular telephone containing  a memory 
capacity akin to a computer)  that may be found in 
the premises even where the warrant specifically 
grants an authority to search for documentary 
evidence of occupation or ownership,” she said. In 
her opinion, a warrant must expressly  authorize a 
search for documents in electronic form. Although 
the judge admitted the images from the security 
computer (desk top), the evidence obtained from the 
personal computer (laptop)  and the cellular 
telephone was excluded. The judge was not satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had 
knowledge and control of the grow-operation. All 
charges were subsequently dismissed. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal concluded 
there  was a basis on which the 
authorizing  justice could have 
included documentary evidence in 
the list of things to be searched for. In its view, the 
trial judge re-weighed the grounds set out in the ITO 
and substituted her view for that of the authorizing 
judge. Justice Frankel, writing  the Court’s judgment, 
found the facts in the ITO were sufficient to support 
a reasonable inference  that documentation 
evidencing  ownership  or occupancy would be  found 
in the residence. Moreover, he also disagreed with 
the trial judge that the warrant did not authorize the 
police to search computers and cell phones for 
documents showing  ownership  or occupancy. In the 
Appeal Court’s opinion, there was nothing  in the 
nature of electronic devices that required they be 
treated differently than other receptacles found on 
premises for which a search warrant has been 
authorized, such as a filing  cabinet. The warrant 
authorized the police to search for documentation 
that could assist in determining  who was in control 
of the premises, including  documentation contained 
in the computers and cellular telephone. The 
evidence obtained from the examination of those 
devices should have been admitted.  The Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittals were 
set aside and a new trial was ordered. 
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused appealed, arguing 
the Court of Appeal was wrong 
in concluding  that the warrant 
(1)  properly permitted a search 
for documentation identifying 
the owners and/or occupants 
and (2) included authorization to search the 
computers and cellular telephone. A nine-member 
unanimous Supreme Court panel rejected one of 
these submissions while agreeing with the other. 
Documentation?
The Supreme Court found the ITO did establish 
reasonable grounds to believe that relevant 
documents would be found in the residence. 
Although the affiant police officer did not expressly 
state his belief that documentation identifying 
ownership and/or occupancy would be found in the 
residence, the facts in the ITO were sufficient to 
support a reasonable inference that such evidence 
would be found. In this case, a justice of the peace 
could draw the inference that there would likely be 
documentation inside the  residence. Thus, the trial 
judge (reviewing  judge)  erred in substituting  her 
opinion for that of the  justice of the  peace issuing 
the warrant (authorizing judge):  
The question for the reviewing  judge is “whether 
there was reliable evidence that might 
reasonably be believed on the basis of which the 
authorization could have issued, not whether in 
the opinion of the reviewing judge, the 
application should have been granted at all by 
the authorizing judge”. In applying this test, the 
reviewing judge must take into account that 
authorizing  justices may draw reasonable 
inferences from the evidence in the ITO; the 
informant need not underline the obvious.
The ITO set out facts sufficient to allow the 
authorizing justice to reasonably draw the 
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inference that there were reasonable grounds to 
believe that documents evidencing  ownership or 
occupation would be found in the residence. In 
particular, the ITO referred to the premises to be 
searched as a “residence” and as a “two (2) story 
house”. It also indicated that the [accused] 
owned the property and that electricity was 
being consumed there. In my view, it is a 
reasonable inference that a residence would be 
the place to look for documents evidencing 
ownership or occupation. Where else would one 
expect to find such documents if not in the 
residence itself? Moreover, I think that the 
authorizing justice could reasonably infer that a 
place was being  occupied as a residence from 
the fact that electricity was being  consumed at 
that place and that it had an owner. [references 
omitted, paras. 16-17]
It was open to the authorizing  justice to lawfully 
issue the search warrant for documents evidencing 
ownership or occupation of the property, thus there 
was no s. 8 Charter breach on this basis. 
Computer Searches
Noting  that privacy interests in computers (and 
cellular telephones)  are markedly different from 
searches of receptacles such as filing  cabinets and 
cupboards, the Supreme Court ruled that a search 
warrant authorizing  the search for documentation 
identifying  ownership and occupancy did not permit 
police to look in computers and cell phones found 
in the  residence. Instead, the police are required to 
get specific, prior authorization to search such 
devices. An after-the-fact review, it found, would not 
provide sufficient protection for the privacy rights at 
stake  during  a computer search. In a sense, 
computers are to be treated as a separate place 
requiring  a warrant. “Computers potentially give 
police access to vast amounts of information that 
users cannot control, that they may not even be 
aware of or may have chosen to discard and which 
may not be, in any meaningful sense, located in the 
place of the search,” said Justice Cromwell speaking 
for the Court. “These factors, understood in light of 
the purposes of s. 8  of the  Charter, call for specific 
pre-authorization.” 
Although there is a general proposition that a  search 
warrant to look for specific  things at a specific 
location provides authority to reasonably examine 
anything  at the location within which the specific 
thing  might be found, computers are to be treated 
differently:
Computers differ in important ways from the 
receptacles governed by the traditional 
framework and computer searches give rise to 
particular privacy concerns that are not 
sufficiently addressed by that approach. One 
cannot assume that a justice who has authorized 
the search of a place has taken into account the 
privacy interests that might be compromised by 
the search of any computers found within that 
place. This can only be assured if, as is my view, 
the computer search requires specific pre-
authorization. [para. 2]
And further:
[T]he general principle is that authorization to 
search a place includes authorization to search 
places and receptacles within that place. This 
general rule is based on the assumption that, if 
the search of a place for certain things is 
justified, so is the search for those things in 
receptacles found within that place. However, 
this assumption is not justified in relation to 
computers because computers are not like other 
receptacles that may be found in a place of 
search. The particular nature of computers calls 
for a specific assessment of whether the intrusion 
of a computer search is justified, which in turn 
requires prior authorization. [references omitted, 
para. 39]
The Supreme Court then went on to outline, in 
viable way, how its ruling  applied to police searches 
of computers:
“[I]t is a reasonable inference that a 
residence would be the place to look for 
documents evidencing ownership or 
occupation. Where else would one expect 
to find such documents if not in the 
residence itself?”
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In practical terms, the requirement of specific, 
prior authorization means that if police intend to 
search computers found within a place with 
respect to which they seek a warrant, they must 
satisfy the authorizing  justice that they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that any 
computers they discover will contain the things 
they are looking  for. If, in the course of a 
warranted search, police come across a 
computer that may contain material for which 
they are authorized to search but the warrant 
does not give them specific, prior authorization 
to search computers, they may seize the device 
but must obtain further authorization before it is 
searched. [para. 3]
And again:
Specific, prior authorization means, in practical 
terms, that if police intend to search any 
computers found within a place they want to 
search, they must first satisfy the authorizing 
justice that they have reasonable grounds to 
believe that any computers they discover will 
contain the things they are looking for. They 
need not, however, establish that they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that computers 
will be found in the place, although they clearly 
should disclose this if it is the case. I would add 
here that once a warrant to search computers is 
obtained, police have the benefit of s. 487(2.1) 
and (2.2) of the Code, which allows them to 
search, reproduce, and print data that they find. 
If police come across a computer in the course 
of a search and their warrant does not provide 
specific authorization to search computers, they 
may seize the computer (assuming it may 
reasonably be thought to contain the sort of 
things that the warrant authorizes to be seized), 
and do what is necessary to ensure the integrity 
of the data. If they wish to search the data, 
however, they must obtain a separate warrant. 
[para. 48-49]
The Supreme Court , however, rejected a 
constitutional requirement of search protocols - 
conditions limiting  how computers are to be 
searched - as part of the warrant. It also was careful 
to highlight that the warrant requirement for 
computers only applied to computers found during 
searches with a warrant and did not apply to all 
other types of computer searches:
Computers v. Traditional Receptacles?
The Supreme Court provided several reasons why 
computers should be treated differently than  other 
receptacles, such as cupboards and filing cabinets.
1. Massive Storage Capacity. Computers can 
store immense amounts of information, some of 
which may be personal. For example, a terabyte hard 
drive could hold about 1,000,000 books of 500 
pages each, 1,000 hours of video or 250,000 four 
minute songs. Even an 80 gigabyte drive can  store 
40,000,000 pages of text.
2. Automatically Generated Information. 
Computers o f ten  automat ica l ly generate 
information without the users’ knowledge, such as 
temporary files. These files can permit analysts to 
reconstruct the development of a word-processing 
document, accessing information about who created 
and worked on it, or enable investigators to check 
which websites were visited, the search terms used, 
and intimate details about a user’s interests, habits, 
and identity. 
3. Retention of Destroyed Data. Computers 
retain information that users have tried to erase. 
“Deleting” a file normally does not actually delete it. 
If an operating system has not reused a file cluster 
marked for deletion, it will remained undisturbed. 
And, even if another file is assigned to the cluster 
marked for deletion, a tremendous amount of data 
often can be recovered by an analyst. 
4. Computers Act As Portals. A search of a 
computer connected to the Internet or a network 
gives access to information and documents that are 
not in any meaningful sense at the location for 
which the search is authorized. For example, a 
computer that is connected to a network will allow 
police to access information on other devices.  On 
in other hand, a s. 487 search warrant will only 
permit the search of a receptacle, like a filing 
cabinet, that is physically present within the building, 
receptacle or place for which a search has been 
authorized and does not permit access to items that 
are not physically present. While documents 
accessible in a filing cabinet are always at the same 
location as the filing cabinet, the same is not true of 
information that can be accessed through a 
computer. 
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It is not my intention to create a regime that 
applies to all computers or cellular telephones 
that police come across in their investigations, 
regardless of context. As the [Crown] correctly 
points out, police may discover computers in a 
range of situations and it will not always be 
appropriate to require specific, prior judicial 
authorization before they can search those 
devices. For example, I do not, by way of these 
reasons, intend to disturb the law that applies 
when a computer or cellular phone is searched 
i n c i d e n t t o a r r e s t o r wh e r e e x i g e n t 
circumstances justify a warrantless search. 
Rather, these reasons relate to those situations 
where a warrant is issued for the search of a 
place and police want to search a computer 
within that place that they reasonably believe 
will contain the things for which the search was 
authorized. As noted earlier, it is not necessary 
that the police present reasonable grounds that a 
computer will be found in order to obtain a 
warrant that includes authorization to search a 
computer found in the premises.
While the scope of these reasons is restricted to 
warranted searches of a place, they apply 
equally to all computers found within a place 
with respect to which a search warrant has been 
issued. Put differently, any time that police 
intend to search the data stored on a computer 
found within a place for which a search has 
been authorized, they require specific 
authorization to do so. I find no reason, for the 
purposes of prior authorization, to treat 
computers differently on the basis of the 
particular use to which they have been put. For 
example, in this case, I make no distinction 
between the “personal” computer and the 
“security” computer for the purposes of prior 
authorization because both were capable of 
storing personal information.   Computers do not 
distinguish between personal data and non-
personal data; if information can be reduced to a 
series of ones and zeros, it can be stored on any 
computer. Moreover, decisions about whether or 
not to search the data on a device must be made 
before police know exactly what it contains. 
Rare will be the case where police know, at the 
authorization stage before they search a device, 
whether a computer is used for personal 
p u r p o s e s o r n o t . W h e n i t c o m e s t o 
authorization, then, I would treat all computers 
in the same way. [paras. 63-64]
Exclusion of Evidence
Despite the s. 8  Charter breaches, the Supreme 
Court refused to find the  evidence obtained from the 
personal computer or the cell phone inadmissible 
under s. 24(2). The accused’s appeal was dismissed 
and the order setting  aside his acquittals and 
ordering a new trial was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
“[I]f police intend to search any computers found within a place they want to search, they 
must first satisfy the authorizing justice that they have reasonable grounds to believe that 
any computers they discover will contain the things they are looking for. They need not, 
however, establish that they have reasonable grounds to believe that computers will be 
found in the place, although they clearly should disclose this if it is the case.”
A nOte On nOte-taking
A sergeant involved in the Vu case searched the 
computers. During the trial he admitted he 
intentionally had not made any notes of his 
computer searches to ensure he would not have to 
testify in court about the details of the searches.
The Supreme Court of Canada found this to be a 
“disquieting” - troubling - aspect of the search. 
“This is clearly improper and cannot be 
condoned,” said Justice Cromwell. “Notes of 
how a search is conducted should … be 
k e p t , a b s e n t u n u s u a l o r e x i g e n t 
circumstances. Notes are particularly 
desirable when searches of computers are 
involved because police may not be able to 
recall the details of how they proceeded 
with the search.”
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ODOUR	 PLUS	 PROVIDES	 
GROUNDS	 FOR	 ARREST
R. v Mohamed, 2013 ABCA 406
  
After stopping  the accused for making 
an illegal U-turn, the officer saw him 
rummaging  near the passenger seat. 
She then noted an extremely strong, 
very skunky and distinct odour of 
fresh marihuana coming  from inside the vehicle as 
she approached the open driver’s window. The 
accused was nervous, sweating  profusely  and did 
not look directly at the officer, instead looking 
straight ahead. The officer told the accused that she 
smelled marihuana in the vehicle and asked him if 
there  was any in it. He replied no, but said he may 
have smoked marihuana a couple of days earlier. 
The officer didn’t believe him and asked him to step 
outside so she could determine whether the smell of 
marihuana was coming  from the vehicle  or from 
him. The accused got out and the officer told him 
she could smell marihuana on him. She asked, 
“Why would I still smell it on you if you didn’t have 
any?” At that point, the accused handed over a soft 
cigar box from his jacket. In it, the officer found two 
cigars and one marihuana joint. He was then 
formally arrested for possessing  a controlled 
substance. 
After saying  she could still smell marihuana on him, 
the accused turned over about 5 grams of 
marihuana, wrapped in plastic, from his sock. He 
was then patted down and $300 cash was seized. 
Inside a  jacket pocket, which the accused had been 
wearing, a baggie containing  25 individual pieces of 
crack cocaine was found. An arrest for possession for 
the purposes of trafficking  followed. The officer then 
searched the vehicle, finding  a black tote in the 
middle of the passenger’s seat. This would have been 
within the accused’s easy  reach. Although no longer 
smelling  the odour of marihuana in the car, the 
officer looked inside the tote  and found more 
individually wrapped pieces of cocaine weighing 
134.4 grams and an Arminius revolver, fully loaded. 
He was then arrested for possessing  the firearm and, 
for the first time, advised of his right to counsel 
under s. 10(b)  of the Charter. He was charged with 
several drug and weapons offences. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The officer testified she was familiar with 
the odour of marihuana. Based on her 
training, experience and involvement 
with between 300-500 marihuana 
investigations, she said she  was capable of 
identifying  and differentiating  between the smell of 
fresh and burnt marihuana. She also said she had 
grounds to arrest the accused before he produced 
the marihuana joint. These grounds were based on 
the odour of fresh marihuana and the accused’s 
extremely nervous behaviour, profuse sweating, 
looking  straight ahead and, aside from answering 
her questions, he did not engage in conversation 
with her. The judge ruled the officer had reasonable 
grounds (both subjectively  and objectively)  to arrest 
the accused for marihuana possession, even before 
he stepped out of the vehicle. The searches of his 
person and jacket, although warrantless, were 
searches incident to lawful arrest for officer safety 
and did not breach s. 8 of the Charter. The 
warrantless search of the tote bag  was also valid as 
incident to arrest for the purpose of discovering 
evidence that could be used at trial. 
The judge also found there was no violation under s. 
10(a)  - reason for arrest or detention. Although the 
accused was detained for a drug  investigation when 
the officer told him she smelled marihuana in the 
vehicle and asked him to get out, a reasonable 
person in the circumstances would have been aware 
that the traffic stop  had expanded to include an 
investigation into the presence of marihuana. But the 
judge did find a  s. 10(b)  infringement because the 
officer failed in her obligation to advise the accused 
immediately upon his arrest about his right to 
counsel. The evidence, however, was admitted 
under s. 24(2). The accused was convicted of 
possessing  159 grams of crack cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking  and several weapons offences 
(possessing  loaded firearm, possessing  firearm 
without a licence, possessing  firearm without 
registration certificate and being  the occupant of a 
motor vehicle in which he knew there was a 
restricted weapon). He was sentenced to 4.5 years in 
prison. 
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Alberta Court of Appeal
In addition to the s. 10(b) breach, the 
accused argued that his rights under 
ss. 8 and 10(a)  were also violated. In 
his view, the evidence should have 
been excluded under s. 24(2). However, a majority 
of the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s ruling. 
10 (a) Charter - reason
Under s. 10(a) “an individual who is detained must 
be advised in clear and simple language of the 
reason for the  detention.” It is the  substance of what 
is said and what the accused can reasonably be 
supposed to understand, rather than the formalism 
of the precise words used, that matters in assessing 
whether s. 10(a)  has been breached. In this case, the 
majority stated:
A reasonable person, having been told by a 
peace officer that she smelled marihuana 
coming from the vehicle he was driving would 
understand the peace officer was beginning a 
criminal investigation into an offence involving 
marihuana. The officer herself was not in a 
position at this point in her investigation to even 
know the specific offence she was investigating 
although she did know it involved marihuana. 
[para. 23]
The accused’s s. 10(a) rights were not infringed.
 
s. 8 Charter - search
 
Section 495(1)(b)  of the Criminal Code  permits a 
police officer to arrest without warrant “a person 
whom he finds committing  a criminal offence.” 
Here, the majority found this provision allowed the 
arrest:
In our view, the peace officer would have been 
justified, pursuant to section 495(1)(b), to arrest 
the [accused] for possession on the basis of the 
smell of fresh marihuana (i.e. possessing a 
controlled substance) even before he exited the 
vehicle. ... [A] warrantless arrest requires both a 
subjective and objective basis; the arresting 
officer must personally believe that reasonable 
and probable grounds for arrest exist, and those 
grounds must be justifiable from an objective 
point of view.
The trial judge found both bases. She found the 
peace officer personally believed she could 
make the arrest based on the smell of fresh 
marihuana coming  from the vehicle in which 
the [accused] was the driver and sole occupant, 
and the [accused’s] nervous behaviour, and 
further found given the peace officer’s 
experience that these were reasonable and 
probable grounds for arrest. [references omitted, 
paras. 25-26]
Thus, the arrest was proper and not rendered 
unlawful either under s. 495(2) or by the officer 
asking  a few further questions after the accused had 
exited the vehicle that were designed to give him 
the benefit of the doubt, 
The majority  also found that once the  accused was 
arrested for possessing  marihuana, the searches that 
followed were lawful:
[S]earches incidental to arrest “must be truly 
incidental to the arrest in question”. The test for 
whether a search is truly incidental to arrest is 
both subjective and objective. The police must 
have one of the purposes for a valid search 
incident to arrest in mind when the search is 
conducted, and the officer’s belief that this 
purpose will be served by the search must be a 
reasonable one. Searches may be for the 
purposes of safety, to preserve evidence, or to 
find evidence to be used at trial.
The peace officer in this case was searching to 
discover evidence that could be used at trial and 
her search was objectively reasonable given the 
smell of fresh marihuana and the marihuana 
given to the officer by the [accused]. Although 
her further questioning produced a second 
amount of marihuana, it would have been 
discovered upon a pat-down search to ensure 
“[A] warrantless arrest requires both a 
subjective and objective basis; the arresting 
officer must personally believe that 
reasonable and probable grounds for arrest 
exist, and those grounds must be justifiable 
from an objective point of view.”
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officer safety. The additional evidence found by 
the officer would have resulted from her search 
even if no further questioning  of the [accused] 
had occurred. [references omitted, paras. 28-29]
The warrantless searches were properly incidental to 
arrest and there were no s. 8 Charter breaches. 
Exclusion of Evidence
The trial judge found there was about a 10 minute 
delay between the accused’s initial detention and 
the advisement of his section 10(b)  Charter rights. 
However, there was no nexus between that delay 
and the discovery of the evidence, which was 
obtained through lawful searches. The trial judge’s s. 
24(2) analysis was entitled to considerable deference 
and there was no basis to interfere with her ruling. 
Having  found the trial judge made no unreasonable 
findings or errors of law, the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
A Second Opinion
 
Justice Berger, writing  a  dissenting 
opinion, found that the officer did not 
have the requisite objective grounds to 
just i fy  arrest ing  the accused for 
possession before  he got out of the car. Plus, the 
questioning  that followed was not preceded with 
compliance under s. 10 of the  Charter. The failure of 
the police to afford the accused his s. 10(b)  rights 
resulted in a s. 8  breach because he felt compelled 
to respond to the questions put to him. He had a 
right to refuse to participate in the officer’s 
investigation and search for contraband. In Justice 
Berger’s view, the foundation for the searches of the 
jacket, vehicle and tote flowed directly from these 
ss. 10(b) and 8 Charter violations. 
A new s. 24(2) analysis favoured exclusion. Although 
trafficking  in cocaine and possession of illegal 
firearms were serious offences, the Charter infringing 
conduct was serious while the impact on the 
accused’s rights was profound. Justice Berger would 
have excluded the evidence, allowed the accused’s 
appeal and set aside his convictions.    
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
s.	 10(b)	 BREACH	 RESULTS	 IN	 
EXCLUSION	 OF	 HOSPITAL	 
BLOOD	 DRAW
R. v. Taylor, 2013 ABCA 342
 
In the early morning  hours, the 
accused failed to make a turn, 
rolled his vehicle and significantly 
injured three of his passengers. He 
was arrested for impaired driving 
causing  bodily harm, read his Charter rights to 
counsel and told he would be provided with a 
telephone if he wanted to call a lawyer. He said he 
wanted to talk to one. A paramedic on scene 
determined the accused was ambulatory with no 
neural deficits, no difficulty communicating  and no 
problematic speech. He was alert, not slurring  and 
answered questions in an appropriate, normal 
manner. He made no medical complaints and was 
clear that he was not in need of further medical 
attention. But the paramedic, out of an abundance 
of caution, talked him into being  transported by 
ambulance to the hospital.
 
A police officer at the scene travelled to the hospital 
in a separate vehicle to acquire evidence from the 
accused, including  tracking  his blood so a warrant 
could be obtained. The officer waited in the hospital 
hallway with the accused. He was laying  on a 
stretcher for half an hour while  waiting  to see a 
doctor. No effort was made to permit access with 
counsel, despite the availability  of the officer’s cell 
phone. After the  accused’s blood was taken for 
medical purposes, the officer gave the blood 
demand and blood samples were drawn for that 
purpose. At no time was the accused afforded an 
opportunity to contact counsel while at the hospital. 
Police later obtained a warrant to seize the hospital 
blood for evidentiary purposes and sent it off for an 
analysis resulting in a BAC of 197mg%.
 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench  
 
The officer testified that there  was a 
telephone wired in the cruiser as well as 
his personal cell phone, which he used 
sometimes to carry out his duties. He said 
he made a mistake in not making  his cell phone 
available, either at the  scene or the hospital. The 
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accused argued his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel 
was violated when police failed to provide him with 
an opportunity to retain and instruct counsel without 
delay. 
The judge found no such breach at the accident 
scene, the police  having  legitimate safety concerns 
rendering  it unreasonable to provide cell phone 
access, whether in the police car or elsewhere. As 
for the hospital, the judge concluded that there was 
no reasonable opportunity to provide telephone 
access prior to the hospital blood draw. The accused 
was waiting  (or receiving)  emergency medical 
treatment. However, once the hospital blood sample 
was obtained, there was a s. 10(b) breach. The 
officer made a blood demand without taking  steps to 
implement the accused’s right to counsel. The 
Crown, however, did not tender the blood demand 
samples, instead relying  on the hospital blood 
samples. Since the s. 10(b) breach was not linked to 
the production of the hospital blood samples, s. 24
(2)  did not apply. The warrant was properly issued 
and the analysis of the hospital blood samples were 
admissible. A blood expert extrapolated the sample 
readings and concluded the accused’s BAC would 
have been 147 to 227 mg% at the time of the 
accident. The accused was convicted on three 
counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm.
 
Alberta Court of Appeal
 
The accused submitted that the trial 
judge erred in not finding  a Charter 
breach when the officer failed to 
facilitate access to counsel. Justices 
Berger and O’Brien agreed, holding  that the officer 
could have made his cell phone available to the 
accused at the accident scene or in the hospital. In 
their view, the  police failed to provide a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel without delay before 
the hospital blood draw. This was not a  situation 
where  it was impractical to provide access to a 
telephone. The accused was not in need of urgent 
medical care  and was capable of and wanting  to 
speak to a lawyer. He was not uncooperative or 
difficult to control. Providing  access to a  telephone 
would not have disrupted the scene or interfered 
with the police investigation. Nor was the lack of 
privacy an excuse. “The officers could surely have 
withdrawn a sufficient distance to provide an 
adequate measure of privacy while at the  same time 
keeping  the [accused] under observation,” said the 
majority. Plus, the officer never suggested any 
concerns about officer safety  or cleanliness as 
making  it impracticable for him to provide access to 
a phone. Moreover, the officer admitted he failed to 
make his cell phone available. He said he had it 
with him and would have made it available had he 
thought to do so. Without the benefit of legal advice 
before the hospital blood draw, the accused was 
unable to exercise a meaningful and informed 
choice about whether he  should consent to the 
hospital blood draw. 
 
The majority also found the police participated in 
the collection of the hospital blood draw such that a 
s. 8  breach resulted. Although there was no doubt 
the hospital blood was to be used for medical 
purposes, it was also to be used for police purposes. 
The police deliberately  delayed making  a demand 
until after the hospital blood was drawn. As a 
consequence, the accused did not associate the 
hospital blood draw with measuring  the alcohol in 
his blood. Thus, the hospital blood draw breached s. 
8:
[T]here is no denying that the blood draw was 
intended for the hospital’s own purposes, yet it is 
equally apparent that the police intrusion as 
bedside attendants was strictly for the benefit of 
the police. In our view, there was on the part of 
medical personnel an unfortunate acquiescence 
in permitting agents of the state, the police, to be 
Timeline
1:25 - Accident
1:31 - Police on scene
1:41 - Arrest
1:43 - s. 10(b) Charter
1:50 - Paramedics on scene
2:19 - En-route to hospital
2:43 - Arrive at hospital
3:05 - Hospital blood draw
3:13 - Blood demand
4:53 - Blood demand draw
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side-by-side with medical personnel engaged in 
a medical procedure. In so doing, there was a 
failure on the part of the hospital to comply with 
its “duty to respect a person’s privacy”. [para. 
34]
The majority also found the warrant did not cure the 
s. 10(b) breach and the evidence was excluded 
under s. 24(2). The accused’s appeal was allowed, 
his conviction quashed and an acquittal was 
entered. 
 
A Different View
Justice Slatter, authoring  a dissenting 
opinion, found there was no s. 10(b) 
breach because the circumstances at the 
accident scene and at the hospital 
precluded a reasonable opportunity to facilitate 
contact with counsel. This included a determination 
that there was no legal obligation on the officer to 
make her private cell phone available to the 
accused. 
He also held the sample obtained by the hospital 
staff was for their own purpose. They were not 
colluding  with the  police in getting  it. Thus, the 
police did not breach their implementational duty by 
not refraining  from gathering  evidence from an 
accused who expressed a desire to consult with 
counsel.  “The Charter does not require  the police to 
refrain from any other investigative activity  until the 
detained person speaks to counsel, nor does it 
prevent third parties (such as hospital personnel) 
from carrying  on their business, even if that might 
result in the creation of evidence,” said Justice 
Slatter. “Doctors who are lawfully  discharging  their 
medical duties are  not agents of the state, and their 
activities do not result in s. 10(b) breaches.” There 
was no informational obligation on the police to 
advise the accused that he had the right to refuse 
medical treatment that might result in the creation of 
evidence. Nor was there  a  police duty to interfere 
with the work of the medical professionals or 
provide medical advice inconsistent with that given 
by the doctors. Justice Slatter would have upheld the 
warrant and, since the seizure of the hospital blood 
was not tainted by any Charter breach, dismiss the 
accused’s appeal.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
NO	 RESTRICTIVE	 REQUEST	 OR	 
DEMAND:	 DETENTION	 DID	 NOT	 
CRYSTALLIZE
R. v. Peterson, 2013 MBCA 104     
A man called police after arriving 
home and finding  his roommate 
dead, lying  in blood-soaked sheets 
on the bed. Homicide detectives 
were interested in speaking  to the 
accused after learning  he was the last person to see 
the deceased alive. He was viewed as a person of 
interest and possibly a witness. He was not yet a 
suspect because police viewed him as the 
deceased’s friend and had no reason to link him to 
the killing. They hoped he might be able to provide 
some information that would lead them to the next 
step in their investigation. After locating  him outside 
a building  at 5:31 pm, two detectives approached 
him, identified themselves as police, told him they 
hoped he would be prepared to help them with the 
investigation and asked if he  would go to the police 
station with them. The accused readily agreed and 
seemed anxious to help. However, neither detective 
told him that the deceased had been murdered 
because, in their experience, using  the word 
“murder” can frighten people, who then become 
reluctant to get involved. He was patted down, put 
in the  back of the police car and his backpack and 
skateboard were placed in the  trunk. During  the 
drive to the police station, the  accused was friendly, 
cooperative, polite, quite talkative, volunteered 
many details about his life and, at one point, asked 
how he could help  with the investigation. He was 
told they would discuss that at the police station.
When they arrived at the  police station, the  accused 
was placed in a standard interview room. This room 
was used to interview suspects, persons of interest or 
victims. It was small, had minimal furniture (which 
was attached to the floor)  and a door that locked 
from the outside. The accused was left alone for a 
period of time, but was given cigarettes and pizza, 
and taken to the washroom. At 8:16  pm, the 
detectives began to interview him. The accused 
offered many details about his relationship with the 
deceased, including  buying  crack  cocaine from him 
and delivering  drugs to other customers on a regular 
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basis. A detective asked whether the  deceased was 
killed for his stash of drugs. The detective thought 
was an obvious question, given that the  deceased 
was obviously a mid-level drug  dealer.  After a 
lengthy pause, the accused said, “No, he wasn’t 
killed for drugs”.   The detective then asked why the 
deceased was killed.  There was another lengthy 
pause and the accused said, “I fell asleep on his bed 
and when I woke up  he was performing  a sexual 
act”.  The detective then asked the accused “What?”, 
to which he replied, “A blow job.  I lost it and I 
grabbed a hammer that was near and hit him.” The 
accused was upset, seemed embarrassed and started 
crying. When asked what he did next, the accused 
said that he grabbed his stuff and left. The accused 
was then arrested, advised of his right to counsel and 
subsequently charged with second degree murder.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge found the accused was not 
detained within the  meaning  of s. 10(b) of 
the Charter at any time before he said that 
he hit the deceased on the head with the 
hammer. He was free to leave at any time up until 
that confession. All that the detectives knew was that 
he was the deceased’s friend and had been at the 
apartment the day before the body was found. They 
had no grounds to suspect or arrest him at any point 
before he confessed. They asked him to help and he 
was eager to do so. He was an adult and very 
comfortable with the officers. Talking  to him was the 
next step  in the investigation and their manner of 
approach was respectful, casual and very low key. 
The pat down search, being  transported in a locked 
car, having  his backpack and skateboard taken and 
being  placed in a stark, locked interview room were 
all safety and security  measures that are part of 
modern police work. The judge held that a 
reasonable person living  in any Canadian 
community today would recognize this. The 
accused’s motion to exclude his statement from 
evidence was dismissed and a jury found him guilty 
of manslaughter. He was sentenced to nine years in 
prison, less 52 months for time served. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused appealed, arguing  he 
was detained, his s. 10(b)  rights 
were violated and his statement 
was inadmissible. He contended he 
was psychologically detained when the police first 
picked him up to interview him after singling  him 
out for a focussed investigation. Or, if he was not 
detained upon initial contact with police, he submits 
he was detained when the detectives asked him if 
the deceased was killed “for his stash.” It was at this 
time he was now being  asked pointed questions 
about his knowledge of the murder and he no longer 
remained merely “a person of interest.” The Crown, 
on the other hand, suggested that the accused was 
never a suspect at any time before he confessed to 
hitting  the deceased on the head with a hammer.  
Before that, he was always only a  person of interest 
and possible witness who, police hoped, would 
provide some information in their investigation. 
Detention
Justice Beard, writing  the Court of Appeal’s opinion, 
first reviewed the law regarding  psychological 
detention and stated:
[I]t is clear that not every interaction between 
the police and a member of the public will 
constitute a detention. For such an interaction to 
const i tu te a detent ion, there are two 
requirements:
- the first requirement is that there must be a 
restrictive request or demand by the police to 
the member of the public; and
- the second requirement, where there is no 
legal obligation to comply with that request or 
demand, focusses on the state conduct in the 
context of the surrounding legal and factual 
situation and how that conduct would be 
perceived by a reasonable person in the 
situation as it developed. [para. 38]
Here, there was no restrictive  request or demand by 
the police when they first contacted the accused. 
“The fact that the police ask pointed questions about the crime does not necessarily turn a 
person of interest into a suspect.”
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The officers asked him if he could help with the 
investigation and he readily agreed.  The test for 
detention is objective – being  whether a reasonable 
person in the situation would conclude by reason of 
the state conduct that he or she had no choice but to 
comply. In this case, the accused did not testify. 
Although not essential to determining  whether or not 
there  was a psychological detention, an accused’s 
testimony can be helpful in explaining  the effect that 
police conduct had on him. 
Furthermore, the accused was not detained at any 
time before the detectives asked him about the 
motive for the murder. “The police have an 
obligation to investigate crimes, and not every 
interaction with the police  will amount to a 
detention, even when a person is under investigation 
for, or related to, criminal activity, is asked 
questions, or is physically delayed by contact with 
the police,” said Justice Beard. “The fact that the 
police ask pointed questions about the crime does 
not necessarily turn a person of interest into a 
suspect.”  He continued:
In this case, the purpose of the interview was to 
find out whether the accused could help the 
police solve the murder.   In order to do so, it 
was necessary for the police to ask pointed 
questions about the murder to see if the accused 
had any helpful insights or information.  When 
the accused disclosed facts to the detectives that 
led them to conclude that the deceased was a 
Accused’s Arguments Why He Was Detained Crown’s Arguments Why Accused Not Detained
• He was a crack addict and had been singled out for a focussed 
investigation;
• The police were in possession of much information implicating 
him in the crime that they were investigating, including:  
• he may have been the last person to see the deceased alive; 
• his fingerprints were found at the crime scene;  
• police had information that he might have been involved in an 
intimate relationship with the deceased; 
• police used a covert surveillance team to locate him, rather than 
going to the residence and leaving a message or issuing a “be on 
the lookout” directive;
• When the officers approached him, they showed him their 
badges and agreed that he may have seen their guns; 
• They took him to the police station rather than offering him 
the option of being interviewed in the police car or at another 
location; 
• They did a pat-down search before putting him in the police 
car;  
• They took his backpack and skateboard from him and locked 
them in the trunk of the police car; 
• The accused was transported in the back of a police car, which 
can be opened only from the outside;  
• He was interviewed in the locked room, where the furniture 
was bolted to the ground;  
• He was held for several hours and, ultimately, arrested;
• He was not advised by the detectives that he was being 
interviewed regarding a murder; 
• They did not advise him that they had found his fingerprint as 
the scene of the murder; 
• They had his picture on the video surveillance camera at the 
apartment block; 
• He was the last person seen with the deceased prior to his 
death.
• He was a regular visitor to the apartment and had arrived 
there a long time (14 hours) before the deceased was 
discovered;
• He was no more a suspect than the deceased’s roommate 
and was the next step in the investigation;
• There was no demand made of the accused. The 
detectives made a request that the accused accompany 
them and he agreed and told them that he wanted to help;
• There was no evidence that the accused felt that he had 
no choice but to comply. He seemed relaxed, comfortable 
and forthcoming in the police car, even asking how he 
could help;
• While the accused was singled out for focussed 
investigation, it was not because they thought he had 
anything to do with the murder, but because he was the 
next step in their investigation;
• He received exactly the same treatment as the deceased’s 
roommate, including being interviewed in the same room, 
and spent less time with the police than did the 
roommate;
• The accused was clearly intelligent, articulate and 
informed; he was a grown man (then 29 years old), had 
worked as a telemarketer and there was no evidence that 
he was either unsophisticated or especially sensitive to the 
police;
• The circumstances of the officers’ contact with the 
accused and the manner in which he was taken to the 
police station were security or safety measures that are 
part of modern police work. The reasonable person in 
contemporary society would see them that way;  
• The detectives treated the accused as a witness 
throughout their dealings with him, and that he was not 
detained at any time before he was arrested.
“[T]he police have an obligation to investigate crimes, and not every interaction with the 
police will amount to a detention, even when a person is under investigation for, or related 
to, criminal activity, is asked questions, or is physically delayed by contact with the police.”
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mid-level cocaine dealer, it was reasonable, due 
to the high level of crime related to drug 
trafficking, for them to ask whether he was killed 
for the drugs.  Given the accused’s friendship 
with the deceased, this question did not 
implicate the accused in the killing, and the 
police were not thinking that it did.  When the 
accused said no, the next question was whether 
he knew why the deceased was killed.  The 
accused responded that he woke up and the 
deceased was performing a sex act, so the 
detective asked, “What?”   Again, this was not an 
unreasonable question arising from the 
accused’s answer, particularly because the 
answer did not suggest that the sex act involved 
the accused. [para. 53]
The accused’s response - that the deceased was 
giving  him a blow job, so he hit him with a hammer 
– was unexpected. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
trial judge’s ruling  that there had been no detention 
at any time prior to the  accused’s statement that he 
hit the deceased with a hammer. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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TARGET’S	 OWN	 WORDS	 
PROVIDED	 REASONABLE	 
SUSPICION:	 NO	 ENTRAPMENT
R. v. Gingras, 2013 BCCA 293
Suspecting  the accused was involved 
in an attempted bombing  of a print 
shop, police embarked on an 
undercover investigation. A police 
officer, posing  as a shady South 
American businessman, broached the topic  of 
money laundering  with the accused Gingras. He 
told Gingras that he had a  problem about what to do 
with the money generated by his business. Gingras 
said he knew of a scheme which used lottery tickets 
as a solution and boasted of laundering  $40 million 
for a  Filipino client.  Gingras’ business partner 
DiQuinzio was also introduced to the officer during 
a coffee shop meeting. The officer took up Gingras’ 
invitation and gave him $25,000 USD, purportedly 
drug  proceeds, to launder. This was followed by a 
second transaction involving  $100,000 USD. On 
both occasions Gingras converted the money to 
Canadian funds less a fee. During  these transactions, 
Gingras made statements of needing  help  bringing 
white powder from South America  to Canada. Later, 
he again repeated that he and DiQuinzio wanted 
cocaine brought to Canada from South America.  
The officer agreed to deal with both men and 
provide 50 kilograms of cocaine at a price of 
$22,000 per kilogram, which they would then 
distribute. The accuseds were arrested after a down 
payment of $375,000 was made.
 
British Columbia Supreme Court
Gingras and DiQuinzio submitted they 
were entrapped. In rejecting  this claim, 
the judge found that a target’s own words 
could provide an of f icer with a 
reasonable suspicion the target was involved in 
crime. In her view, the police had a reasonable 
suspicion Gingras was involved in money 
laundering  and, later, that both men were involved 
with drug  trafficking. Thus, when the undercover 
officer offered the accuseds the opportunity to 
commit a  crime, police had a reasonable suspicion 
to do so. There was no entrapment and no need to 
consider a  stay of proceedings on this basis. Both 
men were convicted of conspiracy to traffic  in 
cocaine and Gingras was also convicted of two 
counts of money laundering.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accuseds argued that the trial 
judge erred in rejecting  their 
entrapment claim. Under the law 
of entrapment, the police must not 
offer a person the opportunity to commit a crime 
unless they have a reasonable suspicion that the 
person is already engaged in the criminal activity. 
Reasonable suspicion does not rise to the  level of 
certainty nor to a belief based on reasonable 
grounds. But it is something  more than a mere 
suspicion.
Gingras submitted that the police lacked the 
necessary reasonable suspicion before the first 
money laundering  transaction. However, the Court 
of Appeal found the trial judge did not err in relying 
on Gingras’ own words to the undercover officer 
when determining  whether the police had the 
requisite reasonable suspicion:
[I]n the language of the common law of 
contract, Mr. Gingras’s approach to Officer A for 
money laundering was not an offer, but an 
invitation to treat – an indication of a willingness 
to enter into negotiations with a view to forming 
an agreement. Presumptively an invitation to 
treat should be enough to satisfy the police that 
the person is already engaged in the proposed 
criminal enterprise and the police can take 
things to the next stage in the form of an offer.  
That is what happened in this case when after 
Mr. Gingras’s invitation Officer A offered Mr. 
Gingras the opportunity to launder US $25,000 
in a trial run. However, I do not think it would 
be correct to say that the accused’s invitation 
necessarily obviates entrapment. … [T]he 
doctrine of entrapment should focus on police 
conduct, not that of the accused.  Having said 
that, it would take a fabulist such as Walter Mitty 
or a Baron von Munchausen to undermine the 
suspicious effect of an invitation by an accused 
to commit an offence.   While Mr. Gingras may 
have puffed up his criminal prowess, he still 
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presented as a plausible money launderer. 
[references omitted, para. 25]
Moreover, the fact Gingras exaggerated his self-
report as a criminal did not require the police to 
conduct a subsidiary investigation to determine 
whether he had the capacity to launder money.
As for the offer to DiQuinzio, the trial judge did not 
err in finding  that it too was based on reasonable 
suspicion.  “Mr. Gingras was an informant whose 
reliability had been confirmed in two money 
laundering  transactions by the time negotiations for 
the cocaine deal got underway,” said Justice Donald. 
Further, the police did a background check on 
DiQuinzio that included, along  with a  dated 
criminal record, police intelligence implicating  him 
in more current drug  activity at a high level. This, in 
combination with Gingras’s offer, suggested 
DiQunzio’s rehabilitation was incomplete.
The accused’s entrapment appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
CIRCUMSTANCES	 PROVE	 
POSSESSION
R. v. B.L., 2013 SKCA 125                    
After receiving  information to be on 
the lookout for a particular GMC 
Jimmy, two police officers located it 
and pulled it over. There were two 
occupants; a driver and a passenger 
(accused)  sitting  in the backseat.  As one of the 
officers walked  toward the Jimmy, it was put into 
gear and began to slowly pull away.  The officer  ran 
up  beside the vehicle, banged on the window and 
removed his revolver from its holster. The driver of 
the Jimmy stopped immediately, put his hands in the 
air and looked toward the backseat. The passenger 
(accused)  was breaching  release  conditions and was 
arrested. A package of white powder could be seen 
on the floor of the vehicle near where he had been 
seated. Under the passenger-side front seat, police 
found a plastic grocery bag  containing  four packages 
of cocaine, one of which was made up  of a number 
of smaller bags of the drug. A small bag  of cocaine, 
packaged in the same manner as the other small 
bags in the  grocery bag, was later found in the 
accused’s pocket.   He also had $660, comprised 
mostly  of $20 bills and some $50s. He was charged 
with possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found the Crown had proven 
possession (knowledge and control) of the 
drugs beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
grocery  bag  containing  the  drugs was 
shoved in from the backseat, as opposed to from the 
front seat, and was by the accused’s right foot. He 
was physically closest to the drugs. As well, the 
packaging  of the cocaine found in the accused’s  
pocket was similar to the cocaine found under the 
seat.  Finally, the cash found in the accused’s  
possession was, as an expert said, consistent with 
the sale of drugs. The judge also noted that the driver 
of the Jimmy and the accused might have been in 
joint possession of the cocaine. The accused was 
convicted of possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused suggested that the 
guilty verdict was unreasonable. 
He said he was not the owner of 
the vehicle and it was the driver 
who began to pull away from the police. In his view, 
these facts suggested the cocaine belonged to the 
driver. Thus, a reasonable doubt about his guilt had 
been raised.
Chief Justice Richards, speaking  for the Court of 
Appeal, disagreed. First, it was not the role of an 
appeal court to retry the case. The trial judge, acting 
judicially, could have  reasonably reached a guilty 
finding  in light of the trial evidence.  In its view, the 
trial judge was entitled to find the accused guilty 
based on the following:
1. The location of the drugs found under the  front 
seat near where his right foot would have rested 
while he rode in the back of the Jimmy. 
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2. The similarity in packaging  between the 
cocaine found in his pocket and some of the 
cocaine found in the grocery bag  stashed under 
the seat. 
3. The significant amount of cash — made up of 
denominations consistent with drug  trafficking
— found on his person. 
4. The packet of cocaine found on the floor of the 
Jimmy near where his feet had been positioned. 
Just because he was not driving  or did not own the 
Jimmy, and the driver began to pull away after being 
stopped by the police did not, individually or in 
combination, render the trial judge’s decision 
unreasonable. The accused’s appeal was dismissed 
and his conviction upheld.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
DELAY	 IN	 PROVIDING	 COUNSEL	 
JUSTIFIED:	 
CIRCUMSTANCES	 DIRE
R. v. Sidhu, 2013 ONCA 719
A 58-year-old man was kidnapped 
from his home, apparently to recover 
the monetary value  of drugs believed 
stolen by an associate of his son-in-
law. Over the next few days he was 
forcibly held captive in a tiny space, beaten and 
held for ransom. He was denied essential diabetes 
medication and his family was terrorized with 
repeated threats by the kidnappers that they would 
beat, maim and kill the victim. They also threatened 
some family  members and their children.  The 
accused and another man were  arrested by police 
shortly after they were seen at a  pay-phone from 
which a ransom call was placed to the victim’s 
family at 5:30 pm. The accused was held for several 
hours by police but was denied access to counsel, 
despite his request to speak to a lawyer. Police had 
feared that any contact with the outside world would 
alert the captors that police were now involved and 
cause them to make good on their threat to kill the 
victim. They proceeded to interrogate  the accused 
for many hours, trying  to ascertain the victim’s 
whereabouts. But he steadfastly denied any 
involvement. 
At 11:50 pm police called and spoke to one of the 
other suspected kidnappers, attempting  to negotiate 
his surrender and the release of the  abductee. Then, 
after the police executed a search warrant at the 
accused’s home just before 1:00 am, his wife 
attended at the  station. At 3:39 am she was 
permitted to speak to the accused. She begged him 
to cooperate. He was then allowed to speak to a 
lawyer at 3:42 am, some 8.5 hrs after the 
interrogation began. Despite his lawyer’s advice not 
to say anything, he  made an incriminating   statement 
when the interrogation resumed. He admitted both 
knowledge of and involvement in the kidnapping, 
implicated other men and said he expected to 
receive between $10,000 - $15,000 for his 
role. Several hours later the victim was found at the 
side of the road by a passing  motorist. He was alive, 
but badly  injured. He had broken ribs, injuries to his 
knee, shoulder, and forehead, and pneumonia. The 
accused, with others, was charged with kidnapping.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued, among  other things, 
that his right under s. 10(b)  of the  Charter 
was breached, therefore rendering  his 
inculpatory statement inadmissible. The 
judge found the police had breached his right to 
counsel by, in part, denying  access to a lawyer 
beyond what was justified.  Although s. 10(b) 
guarantees an accused the right upon arrest or 
detention to retain and instruct counsel without 
delay and to be informed of that right, there are 
circumstances where the police may delay  providing 
access to a lawyer and question the arrestee. Such 
cases, although rare, may arise where there are 
urgent or dangerous circumstances. Here, the judge 
described the situation as dire. “A man’s life hung  in 
the balance,” said the judge. “The kidnappers were 
threatening  not only to dismember the victim but 
also to harm [his] children.”  The police did not 
permit access to counsel out of concern for the 
victim’s safety. They feared that any communication 
with counsel could tip off the captors and result in 
harm to the victim. However, the judge found the 
delay was too long. Once the police changed tactics 
and alerted a co-captor at about midnight to 
negotiate his surrender, the justification for an 
ongoing  denial of counsel disappeared. In his view, 
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the lid had been “blown off the investigation” and 
any justification for denying  access to counsel 
ended. The statement was admitted, however, under 
s. 24(2) and the accused, along  with others, was 
convicted by a jury of kidnapping.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accu sed appea l ed h i s 
conviction arguing, among  other 
things, that the statement he made 
following  his arrest should not 
have been admitted. But the Court of Appeal 
disagreed. “The trial judge fully  appreciated the 
seriousness of the s. 10(b)  Charter breaches,” said 
Justice Gillese. “The trial judge found that exigent 
circumstances justified both a denial of the right to 
counsel and the  continuation of police questioning 
up  to approximately midnight.” However, a  s. 10(b) 
violation occurred when the police denied the 
accused access to counsel beyond the  point where it 
could no longer be justified by an urgent concern for 
the abductee’s life. There  was no basis for interfering 
with the trial judge’s findings and her s. 24(2) ruling 
was owed considerable deference. The conviction 
appeals were dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional case facts taken from R. v. 
Sidhu, 2011 ONSC 2054.
GROUNDS	 TO	 ESTABLISH	 LINK	 
MISSING:	 SEARCH	 WARRANT	 
INVALID
R. v. Golschesky, 2013 SKCA 116
The police  executed a search warrant 
under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act at a residence. They 
seized approximately 10 pounds of 
marihuana, between $20-$30,000 
cash and several items of drug  paraphernalia. The 
suspect (Young)  was arrested when she arrived 
during  the course of the search. Later that day police 
received a call from a confidential source. The 
source knew about the search and told police that 
Young  also kept some marihuana at a “stash house.” 
The source provided another address and said more 
Another Breach
The Ontario Superior Court  in Sidhu also found a 
second Charter breach, described as “repugnant,” when 
the detective “veered into forbidden territory” and 
undermined the lawyer-client relationship by denigrating 
defence counsel. Here’s what the detective said:
Aren’t lawyers great eh?  Aren’t lawyers great?  Aren’t they great?
Sure, they’ve got an important job don’t they?  How can a man look in the 
mirror day after day, day after day, knowing he had a man like you stand up 
and say to a judge who you have to respect; he’s been up there he is doing 
a real public service.
But then this lawyer says to you, plead not guilty.  I don’t care if you did it 
just plead not guilty.  It has nothing to do with, with religion or God or 
anything like that does it?
But think about it.  Day after day, he does that.  Rapists, murderers and 
kidnappers like yourself.  Guys who have 40 calibre guns shoved down into 
their cars.
I know you were driving around with a 40 calibre loaded handgun in your 
car and you were going to do something like that.
And if the police showed up you were going to shoot one of my friends or 
shoot me so I couldn’t go home to my kids.  But the lawyer got up and said, 
plead not guilty to that.  Where is the conscience there?  There is none is 
there?  There is none.
Like I told you, that Bernardo lawyer, let me know where the tapes are I will 
go in and steal them so the police don’t find that evidence of you raping and 
murdering little girls.  Tell me where that is and I will go and hide that.
And you want me to let you phone somebody?  Think about that Sid.  And 
my God if he has been sexually assaulted then what do we do?  Because 
the last few cases I have dealt with the victims have been sexually assaulted 
as well.  And you know it happens.  That is all nice stuff.
Like I say, can you imagine, day after day after day a lawyer being able to 
say to his clients plead not guilty.  Plead not guilty to that.  I can get you off 
of that...”
The judge said this about the exchange:
“[The detective] not only maligned the accused’s counsel, 
but the entire defence bar. In so doing he betrayed the very 
system he is sworn to uphold. Defence counsel play a vital 
role in the criminal justice system. If accused persons are 
persuaded they cannot trust their lawyers, the defence bar 
becomes ineffective; judges and juries can then have no 
confidence that police powers are being held in check, and 
will therefore be reluctant to convict even where the 
evidence warrants such a result. 
In any case, lawyer bashing does not promote public 
confidence in the administration of justice, any more than 
police bashing does. No doubt within each of those 
vocations there is a small percentage of individuals with 
questionable ethics. But that does not entitle police to vent 
their frustrations to suspects facing serious criminal 
charges. However stressful the circumstances he was 
working under, [the detective’s] prolonged denigration of 
the defence bar was a gross infringement of the accused’s 
right to counsel. [paras. 124-125]
Although the judge found this to be “repugnant,” it wasn’t 
enough to render the statement inadmissible under s. 24(2).
...
...
...
...
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marihuana could be found there. The source 
described the house as a  “duplex” but was unsure in 
which unit the marihuana could be found. 
Following  further investigation, the police learned 
the accused owned the property. A search warrant 
was obtained which allowed “Suite A” of the 
premises to be searched. Nine police officers 
executed the warrant, first announcing  their 
presence but then battering  the main floor's door 
down. Police found the accused and, while 
sweeping  through the main floor, saw marihuana 
and cash on a bed. The accused was arrested and 
given a copy of the search warrant. She then told 
police that the residence contained three separate 
living  quarters; upstairs, main floor and basement. 
She said police were in the wrong  place; “Suite A” 
was upstairs. Police broke through the locked door 
to the second level where they found a completely 
separate living  space. In the upstairs apartment they 
found evidence of drug  activity, including  more than 
$5,000 cash, which they concluded belonged to 
Young. The police then returned to the accused’s 
premises and searched it thoroughly, finding  more 
marihuana, an electronic scale and other items. She 
was charged with possessing  marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking  and possessing  proceeds of 
crime.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The evidence at trial showed the accused 
owned the three-level structure which 
had a basement suite  (rented by a tenant), 
main floor (where the accused resided) 
and a self-contained upstairs apartment (rented by 
Young). The judge found the search warrant lacked 
sufficient reasonable grounds upon which the 
issuing  justice could have granted it. This resulted in 
a s. 8  Charter breach, the exclusion of evidence 
under s. 24(2) and acquittals on the charges.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown unsuccessfully argued 
that the trial judge erred in finding 
insufficient reasonable grounds to 
support the warrant. First, the 
Court of Appeal noted there was no link between 
Young  and the accused that would allow a search of 
the accused’s home to find drugs belonging  to 
Young. Nor were there grounds establishing  that the 
accused herself was a drug  trafficker such that she 
was storing  marihuana on her own premises. None 
of the  information implicated the accused in the 
drug  activities under investigation. Second, the 
home was a three unit structure and the police did 
not have grounds to search the main floor. “[The 
privacy expectations of an individual in his or her 
home] translate into an obligation on the person 
seeking  to obtain a search warrant of a person’s 
home—including  in relation to an apartment or unit 
within a multiple family dwelling—to clearly set out 
reasonable and probable grounds for each unit to be 
searched,” said Justice Jackson. In this case, all the 
known information placed the drugs in the 
“upstairs” apartment. Thus, with no known link 
between the accused and Young  and the structure, 
the warrant to search the accused’s dwelling  could 
not have been issued. Although a reviewing  judge is 
required to consider the totality of the  circumstances 
and is not to deconstruct the information supporting 
a search warrant paragraph by paragraph, the trial 
judge in this case did not unfairly view the  ITO or 
impermissibly deconstruct it. Finally, the search 
could not be saved as one conducted incidental to 
lawful arrest or under exigent circumstances. The 
trial judge’s s. 24(2)  ruling  excluding  the evidence 
was also upheld. The Crown’s appeal was dismissed 
and the accused’s acquittals upheld.
Complete case available at www.canli.org
“[The privacy expectations of an individual in his or her home] translate into an obligation 
on the person seeking to obtain a search warrant of a person’s home—including in relation 
to an apartment or unit within a multiple family dwelling—to clearly set out reasonable and 
probable grounds for each unit to be searched.”
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REQUEST	 AN	 INVITATION,	 
NOT	 A	 DEMAND:	 
NO	 DETENTION
R. v. Bennight, 2012 BCCA 190
After calling  for an ambulance, the 
accused arrived at a  large, low 
income, social housing  complex and 
let paramedics into his apartment. 
They found a woman. She appeared 
to be severely beaten and unconscious. Six police 
officers subsequently attended. They  found the 
woman being  treated in the apartment hallway and 
the accused inside his apartment with an ambulance 
supervisor. An officer asked the accused to leave his 
apartment and speak with him.  At the officer’s 
request, the  accused provided his name and birth 
date. He said that he did not want to answer any 
questions and repeatedly said he had three medical 
degrees and two law degrees, and that the judiciary 
would have to be involved as well as internal affairs. 
The officer attempted to speak calmly and focus the 
accused’s attention on the events of the evening. The 
accused was very loud, angry and agitated.  He 
spoke rapidly and in a grandiose manner.  At one 
point, a second officer intervened and had a heated 
verbal exchange with the accused. He took the 
accused by the shoulders and “forcibly removed” 
him from the elevator landing  where EHS was 
working  on the woman. During  further conversation, 
the accused said that he saw “Phyllis” in the 
courtyard earlier in the day. She was wobbly and he 
brought her up to his apartment. Eventually she lost 
consciousness and blood was leaking  out of her ear. 
He thought “Phyllis” had a head injury from falling. 
The apartment was “locked down” and an officer 
guarded the door.
Police decided to take the accused to the police 
station so he could be spoken to in a different 
setting. He was not arrested nor was he a suspect. 
He was viewed as someone who had information 
about how the woman was injured. When asked if 
he would go to the police station, he replied, “no 
problem”.   He was not told that he did not have to 
accompany the police nor was he told he was free to 
go at any time. He was not placed in handcuffs and 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
s. 21(2) Criminal Code
Section 21 of the Criminal Code sets out ways in which a 
person may be liable for an offence, including common 
unlawful purpose. Section 21(2) states:
Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful 
purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in carrying out the 
common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to have 
known that the commission of the offence would be a probable consequence of 
carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence.
This subsection “applies where one person commits an offence beyond 
the one with which the parties had originally planned to assist one 
another,” said the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Cadeddu, 2013 ONCA 
729. “It imposes liability on the other person if that person knew or 
ought to have known that the offence committed would be a probable 
consequence of carrying out the original common unlawful purpose.” 
There are three elements to this mode of liability: 
(1) agreement: there must be an agreement between a principal and a 
party (or parties) to carry out an unlawful purpose. The unlawful purpose 
must be shared by all parties and must be different from the offence 
ultimately committed. A party to an offence under s. 21(2) does not need to 
share the same motives or desires as the principal, but only need to have 
in mind the same unlawful goal. Moreover, the agreement or common 
intention does not need to be formed in advance; it can arise at the time 
the offence is being committed. 
(2) offence: commission of an incidental and different crime by another 
participant. The offence committed is one that the members of the 
original agreement did not set out to commit, but one that took place in 
the course of carrying out their original agreement or plan. Thus, one 
party to the common unlawful purpose must commit an offence that was 
not the offence intended by the parties, but is nonetheless related to the 
original unlawful purpose. The ultimate offence can, however, be very 
closely related to the common intent. For example, the common purpose 
can be assault and the ultimate offence can be aggravated assault. In 
addition, once there is evidence that two or more accused acted in concert, 
s. 21(2) can apply even if it is unclear which of the accused actually 
committed the offence (i.e. which was the principal).
(3) knowledge: foreseeability of the likelihood of the incidental crime 
being committed. Generally, a person will be liable under s. 21(2) if they 
knew or ought to have known that the offence committed by the principal 
was a probable consequence of their unlawful agreement. In determining 
what the person actually knew about the likelihood of another participant 
in the original unlawful plan committing the offence, the words, and 
conduct before, at the time and after the offence, is relevant. When 
assessing foreseeability, the standard is that of a reasonable person in the 
same circumstances.
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he walked, unassisted, beside the officers to the 
police cruiser. During  the ride to the police station, 
he was quiet and peaceful. He was taken to the 
“soft” interview room and given coffee.  He was 
relaxed and calm but refused to write anything  down 
when asked questions.  After consulting  with his 
supervisors, the officer arrested the accused for 
assault causing  bodily harm and advised him of his 
right to counsel. He spoke to Legal Aid. About two 
months later the victim died from her injuries and 
the accused was charged with second degree 
murder.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge found that the accused was not 
detained at the scene, nor did a  detention 
crystallize when he was taken from his 
apartment complex to the “soft” interview 
room at police headquarters a few blocks away. 
“There was clearly no physical restraint or legal 
obligation,” said the judge. “The situation, at least 
initially, was one in which the police were acting  in 
a non-adversarial role. …  In the circumstances, I am 
of the view that a reasonable person in [the 
accused’s] position would conclude that the actions 
of the police in questioning  him, including  [the 
officer’s] intervention, were not intended to restrain 
his liberty, but rather were aimed at facilitating  the 
provision of emergency services, and furthering  the 
sort of police investigation that a  reasonable person 
would expect to be conducted in the circumstances. 
[The accused] was not in fact facing  jeopardy, nor, in 
my view, had he passed into the police's effective 
control.” Nor did the change in venue create a 
detention. A reasonable person would not conclude 
that the change  of location to the police station from 
the housing  complex was a detention. Accordingly, 
the accused was not detained until he was arrested. 
His statements to police prior to his arrest were 
admissible. A jury returned a verdict of guilty on the 
second degree murder charge.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in finding  that he was 
not detained prior to his arrest. He 
submitted that the circumstances, 
including  the brief physical restraint by the officer at 
his apartment plus his statement that he did not want 
to answer any questions, created a detention. 
Therefore, he was entitled to be advised of his right 
to counsel under s. 10(b).
 
Justice Bennett, writing  the Appeal Court’s decision, 
found the trial judge did not err. The police arrived 
in response to a 911 call and had an emergency on 
their hands. They attempted to speak to the accused 
- the 911 caller - and the most obvious source of 
potentially helpful information to further their 
investigation. The encounter between the intervening 
officer and the accused did not result in detention:
 
[The intervening  officer’s] brief contact with [the 
accused] was designed to prevent him from 
interfering with the paramedics’ ability to work. 
To find that a detention crystallized with this 
momentary contact would be to ignore the 
circumstances that immediately preceded and 
ensued.  The physical contact followed a verbal 
confrontation in which each party was an equal 
belligerent.  After moving [the accused] away 
from the paramedics, [the intervening officer] 
retreated and [the investigating  officer] 
continued his attempts to calmly and quietly 
interview [the accused].  It cannot be said that 
[the accused] submitted or acquiesced in the 
deprivation of liberty and reasonably believed 
that the choice to do otherwise did not exist. 
[reference omitted, para. 57]
As for the change of venue, the accused was asked if 
he would accompany the officers to the police 
station. This request was found by the trial judge to 
be an invitation, not a  demand. The accused had not 
demonstrated to the trial judge that he was detained 
on a balance of probabilities. Justice Bennett 
concluded that the “the trial judge considered all of 
the circumstances and the correct legal principles” 
in holding  that the accused was not detained until 
the point of arrest.  The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Editor’s note:  Leave to appeal this case to the 
Supreme Court of Canada was refused, [2012] SCCA 
No 408.
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GRADUAL	 REVEAL	 OF	 EVIDENCE	 
DID	 NOT	 RE-TRIGGER	 s.	 10(b)
R. v. Richard, 2013 MBCA 105          
Following  a murder in which the 
deceased was found severely beaten, 
the accused was arrested and advised 
of his right to counsel and police 
caution. He requested to speak with 
counsel and police  facilitated him with an 
opportunity to do so. Then, during  an interview, the 
investigator progressively revealed evidence that 
police had gathered which implicated him in the 
murder. The evidence included intercepted 
conversations between the accused and his cousin 
where  he admitted to the murder. As well, the 
investigator told him that his common-law wife had 
provided a statement to the police detailing  his 
confessions to her about the murder. The following 
day, at the commencement of a second interview, he 
was told his cousin had provided a  police statement 
respecting  the murder.  The accused then 
immediately agreed to speak with police about the 
incident and confessed.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused submi t t ed tha t t he 
progressive revelation of evidence 
constituted a  “change in circumstances” 
such that he should have been re-advised 
of his right to counsel and provided a further 
opportunity to speak with a  lawyer before his second 
interview. The judge found there  was no s. 10(b) 
violation. In her view, progressively revealing 
information implicating  the accused in this case did 
not constitute a change in circumstances obligating 
the police to provide  him with another opportunity 
to speak with a lawyer.
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused again argued that he 
should have been re-advised of 
and provided another opportunity 
to exercise his s. 10(b) right. In his 
view, the progressive unveiling  of evidence 
constituted an objectively observable change of 
circumstance as described by  the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35 such that, 
despite already exercising  his right to counsel, he 
should have been allowed a further reasonable 
opportunity to consult counsel.  The Crown agreed 
that police revealed evidence in their possession 
during  the interviews. However, the Crown 
submitted that this tactic did not amount to a 
material change in jeopardy such that a renewed 
right to consult a lawyer arose. 
Justice Cameron, authoring  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, concluded the trial judge correctly found 
that the common police tactic of gradually revealing 
evidence, without more, did not engage a change in 
circumstances such that the accused was entitled to 
another opportunity to consult counsel. The purpose 
of s. 10(b) is to provide a detainee with legal advice 
respecting  their rights, such as the right to decide 
whether or not to cooperate with police. There are, 
however, noted exceptions requiring  the police to 
provide a  detainee with an additional opportunity to 
consult counsel. These include (1)  investigations 
where  new or non-routine procedures involving  the 
detainee are to be used, (2)  an investigation that 
takes a  new and more serious turn as events unfold 
which may make the initial advice no longer 
adequate, such as when the nature of the  charges 
change and (3) situations where there  is evidence to 
indicate that a detainee who previously waived his 
right to counsel may not have understood the right.  
But none of these applied in this case. The Court of 
Appeal stated:
The jeopardy that [the accused] was facing 
remained the same throughout the entire 
interview process.  He was charged with 
conspiracy to commit first degree murder and 
first degree murder. [The accused] clearly 
understood his right to remain silent throughout 
the entire interview process, thereby evidencing 
fulfillment of the purpose of s. 10(b) of the 
Charter.  Quite simply, the facts of this case do 
not fall within any exceptions or new categories 
that would trigger a further opportunity to 
consult with counsel. [reference omitted, para. 
58]
The police complied with s. 10(b)  and the accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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THREAT	 NEED	 NOT	 BE	 
CONVEYED	 TO	 INTENDED	 
RECIPIENT
R. v. McRae, 2013 SCC 68
The accused was in a detention 
centre awaiting  trial on several 
charges related to drug  trafficking. 
While in custody he conspired with 
another inmate to attack the Crown 
prosecutor, a  police officer and four witnesses. After 
finding  out about this plan, investigators decided to 
place a listening  device on another inmate. He told 
one inmate that he would rearrange the face of the 
Crown prosecutor and one of the witnesses because 
he thought that he was the one who snitched on 
him. He told another inmate that he had hired a 
private detective to find the Crown prosecutor’s 
address and that once his trial was over he would 
kill the witnesses who had informed against him. He 
also asked this inmate to do what was necessary to 
find the address of the police officer involved in his 
case. As a result, he  was charged under s. 264.1(1)
(a) with several counts of knowingly conveying 
threats to cause death or bodily harm against the 
Crown prosecutor, the police officer and four 
witnesses.  
Court of Quebec
The judge held that the fault element 
(mens rea)  of the threatening  offences had 
not been established. The words were not 
spoken by the accused with the intent that 
they would be conveyed to the subjects of the 
threats in an attempt to influence their actions. In his 
view, “the evidence d[id] not establish that the 
words used by the accused when addressing  [the 
inmates] were intended to reach the ears of the 
possible  or potential witnesses.” Instead, the judge 
found the accused had intended to seek revenge 
once the trial was done and that he had uttered the 
words out of anger and frustration. He was 
acquitted. 
Quebec Court of Appeal
 
The Crown's appeal was dismissed. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with 
the trial judge that the fault 
element had not been established. 
It also concluded that the prohibited act (actus reus) 
had not been proven because the words were 
uttered in a “closed circle” with an expectation of 
confidentiality  and thus they could not instill fear in 
the subjects of the threats. Rather than intending  to 
intimidate, the accused acted out of frustration and 
an intention to seek revenge. The words used were 
not a threat because they were not conveyed to their 
intended recipients nor did they cause anyone to be 
fearful or intimidated. The accused’s acquittals were 
upheld. 
  
Supreme Court of Canada 
A further Crown appeal was 
successful. It was not necessary for 
the Crown to prove that the 
accused’s threats were conveyed to 
their targets or that anyone was actually intimidated 
by them. Rather, the elements of the offence are: (1) 
the utterance or conveyance of a threat to cause 
death or bodily harm; and (2) an intent to threaten. 
Uttering Threats: Actus Reus (Prohibited Act)
Justices Cromwell and Karakatsanis, speaking  for the 
seven member unanimous Court, described the 
actus reus this way:
The prohibited act of the offence is “the uttering 
of threats of death or serious bodily harm”. The 
threats can be uttered, conveyed, or in any way 
caused to be received by any person. The 
question of whether words constitute a threat is 
a question of law to be decided on an objective 
standard. ...
The starting  point of the analysis should always 
be the plain and ordinary meaning  of the words 
uttered. Where the words clearly constitute a 
threat and there is no reason to believe that they 
“[T]he fault element of [uttering threats] is made out if the accused intended the words 
uttered or conveyed to intimidate or to be taken seriously. It is not necessary to prove an 
intent that the words be conveyed to the subject of the threat.
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had a secondary or less obvious meaning, the 
analysis is complete. However, in some cases, 
the context reveals that words that would on 
their face appear threatening may not constitute 
threats within the meaning  of s. 264.1(1)(a). In 
other cases, contextual factors might have the 
effect of elevating to the level of threats words 
that would, on their face, appear relatively 
innocent. [references omitted, paras. 10-11]
And further:
Thus, the legal question of whether the accused 
uttered a threat of death or bodily harm turns 
solely on the meaning that a reasonable person 
would attach to the words viewed in the 
circumstances in which they were uttered or 
conveyed. The Crown need not prove that the 
intended recipient of the threat was made aware 
of it, or if aware of it, that he or she was 
intimidated by it or took it seriously. Further, the 
words do not have to be directed towards a 
specific person; a threat against an ascertained 
group of people is sufficient [for example, threats 
against “police officers” generally, threats against 
“members of the black race” generally.] 
The reasonable person standard must be applied 
in light of the particular circumstances of a case. 
[references omitted, paras. 13-14]
The test, then, is not whether people actually felt 
threatened. Nor is it necessary to prove the threats 
were conveyed to their intended recipients or that 
anyone was in fact intimidated or made fearful. 
Instead, “the prohibited act of the  offence of uttering 
threats will be made out if a reasonable person fully 
aware of the circumstances in which the words were 
uttered or conveyed would have perceived them to 
be a threat of death or bodily harm.”
Uttering Threats: Mens Rea (Fault Element)
As for the mean rea, it is made out if “it is shown 
that threatening  words uttered or conveyed ‘were 
meant to intimidate or to be taken seriously’.” The 
Court stated:
It is not necessary to prove that the threat was 
uttered with the intent that it be conveyed to its 
intended recipient or that the accused intended 
to carry out the threat . Further, the fault element 
is disjunctive: it can be established by showing 
either that the accused intended to intimidate or 
intended that the threats be taken seriously. 
The fault element here is subjective; what 
matters is what the accused actually intended. 
However, as is generally the case, the decision 
about what the accused actually intended may 
depend on inferences drawn from all of the 
circumstances. Drawing  these inferences is not a 
departure from the subjective standard of fault. 
[references omitted, paras. 18-19]
... ... ...
To sum up, the fault element of the offence is 
made out if the accused intended the words 
uttered or conveyed to intimidate or to be taken 
seriously. It is not necessary to prove an intent 
that the words be conveyed to the subject of the 
threat. A subjective standard of fault applies. 
However, in order to determine what was in the 
accused’s mind, a court will often have to draw 
reasonable inferences from the words and the 
circumstances, including  how the words were 
perceived by those hearing them. [para. 23]
Even though the threats were conveyed in a so-
called “closed circle,” their confidential nature did 
not preclude a  finding  that both the actus reus and 
mens rea  had been proven. It was not necessary to 
prove as part of the actus reus (prohibited act)  that 
the threats were conveyed to their intended 
recipients or that anyone was actually  intimidated by 
the threats. Nor is it necessary as part of the mens 
rea (fault element)  to prove that the accused 
intended the threats to be conveyed to their intended 
recipients or that the accused specifically intended 
to intimidate anyone. “Threats are tools of 
intimidation and violence,” said the Supreme Court. 
“As such, in any circumstance where  threats are 
spoken with the intent that they be taken seriously, 
even to third parties, the elements of the offence will 
be made out.”  
Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal made 
legal errors. The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the 
accused’s acquittals were set aside and a new trial 
was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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BRITISH	 COLUMBIA:	 
CANADA’S	 MOST	 EXPLOSIVE	 
PROVINCE
According  to data released by the Canadian Data 
Centre  in 2013, Canada had a total of 185 explosive 
incidents in 2012. British Columbia ranked first 
among  incidents, bombings, attempted bombings, 
improvised explosive  device recoveries, hoax 
devices and explosives thefts.There were four deaths 
reported, two in British Columbia and two in 
Ontario.
The following  definitions will help  explain the 
incidents reported in the table below.
Incidents – The number of times Explosives Disposal 
Units were called to scenes involving  the possible 
use of explosives.
Bombings – Explosions of devices created for non- 
authorized or criminal use.
Attempted  Bombings – An explosion where one or 
more IEDs failed to function because of an 
unintentional defect in design or assembly.
Hoax Devices – A device constructed from inert or 
non-explosive components intended to resemble 
actual bombs.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED)  – A bomb 
created for non-authorized use.
Recovered IEDs – Number of IEDs, that were 
recovered by Explosives Disposal Units. At one 
incident, one or more IEDs can be recovered.
Explosive Thefts – Incidents that involved reporting 
stolen explosives materials.
Explosive  Recoveries – Recovered explosive 
materials that were armed, dumped, stolen or 
suspected to be connected with unlawful activities.
Source: 
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/tops-opst/cbdc-ccdb/crim-use-usage-explo-eng.htm
Region Incidents Bombings Attempted 
Bombings
Hoax 
Devices
Recovered 
IEDs
Explosive 
Thefts
Explosive 
Recoveries
Accidental 
Explosion
British Columbia 62 9 1 17 15 1 19 -
Alberta 18 2 - 1 3 - 12 -
Saskatchewan 20 3 - 2 2 - 12 1
Manitoba - - - - - - - -
Ontario 18 3 1 3 5 - 6 -
Quebec 37 1 - 6 4 - 26 -
New Brunswick 17 1 - 7 - - 9 -
Nova Scotia 2 - - 1 - - 1 -
Prince Edward Island - - - - - - - -
Newfoundland 6 - - - - - 5 1
North West Territories 1 - - - - - 1 -
Yukon 4 - - - - - 4 -
Nunavut - - - - - - - -
Canada 185 19 2 37 29 1 95 2
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DNA	 DATA	 BANK
Did	 you	 know as at November 30, 2013 there 
were ...
... 372,070 DNA profiles contained in the 
National DNA Data Bank (NDDB)  of Canada. This 
includes DNA profiles from the Convicted Offenders 
Index and the Crime Scene Index.
... 281,364 DNA profiles contained in the 
Convicted Offenders Index. These biological 
samples are collected from convicted offenders. 
... 90,706 DNA profiles contained in the Crime 
Scene Index. These samples are collected from crime 
scene exhibits containing biological evidence. 
... 28,619 Offender Hits. This is a  DNA Profile 
developed from Crime Scene evidence matching  a 
DNA profile  in the Convicted Offender Index. These 
cases include:
... 3,384 Forensic Hits. This is a  DNA Profile 
developed from a crime scene matching  another 
Crime Scene DNA profile in the Crime Scene Index. 
In 2012/2013 there were 3,387 Offender Hits.
In 2012/2013 there were 395 Forensic Hits.
Types of bodily  substances collected from convicted 
offenders and analyzed by the NDDB:
• Blood - using  a sterile Lancet to prick the 
fingertip - 304,354 samples
• Buccal - rubbing  a  foam applicator inside 
the mouth to obtain skin cells - 3,725 samples
• Hair - pulling  out six to eight hairs with the 
root sheath attached - 291 samples
The breakdown of convicted offender samples 
includes adult offenders (255,375), young 
offenders (36,098) and military offenders (66).
The NDDB receives 500 to 600 samples per week. 
Sources: 
Statistics for National DNA Data Bank available at:
www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nddb-bndg/stats-eng.htm
National DNA Data Bank of  Canada - Annual Report 
2012/2013 - Measuring Success available at:
www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pubs/nddb-bndg/ann-12-13/ann-12-13-eng.pdf
Offences Total
Break and Enter 10,849
Sexual Assault 3,513
Robbery (armed) 3,254
Assault 2,219
Murder 2,018
Attempted Murder 639
Other 6,127
0.1%
1.2%
98.7%
Blood
Buccal
Hair
0.02%
12.38%
87.60%
Adult
Young
Military
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SEARCH	 WARRANT	 
AMPLIFICATION	 EVIDENCE	 HAS	 
LIMITS
R. v. Voong, 2013 BCCA 527
As a result of a drug  investigation, a 
p o l i c e o f f i c e r p r e p a r e d a n 
Information to Obtain (ITO)  a 
warrant to search a residence for an 
active indoor marihuana growing 
operation. The grounds were  based on the odour of 
vegetative marihuana coming  from the target 
residence, recent power consumption four and a 
half times higher than the average BC Hydro 
customer in the area, windows at the front of the 
residence were covered to prevent the escape of 
high intensity lights and there were previous 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act investigations 
relating  to the target residence, including  a faint 
odour of marihuana smelled near the property three 
months earlier. A telewarrant was obtained and 
executed the following  day by way of a hard entry. 
Officers found 582 marihuana plants, high-wattage 
lights and paraphernalia associated with growing 
marihuana. The accused was the registered owner of 
the house  and only person present when the police 
arrived. He was charged.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused argued the search warrant’s 
ITO, as amplified  on review, did not 
provide sufficient reliable information to 
support its issuance. In his view, the 
information respecting  the odour detected, power 
consumption comparison, window coverings and 
statements about previous investigations was either 
unreliable, erroneous, misleading, wrong  or 
breached the duty of full, fair and frank disclosure. 
He suggested this information, when expunged from 
the ITO, rendered it deficient. Since the search was 
unlawful and breached s. 8 of the Charter, he 
wanted the plants and cultivation equipment seized 
by police excluded as evidence under s. 24(2).
YK
499
Convicted	 Offender	 Samples	 Received	 
By	 Province/Territory
as	 at	 November	 30,	 2013
SK
13,127
AB
32,809
BC
36,823
QC
50,073
ON
135,945
MB
18,488
NWT
1,783 NU
1,589
NB
3,896
NF
4,487
NS
8,094
PEI
757
Source: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nddb-bndg/stats-eng.htm
Canada
308,370
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The investigator, his supervisor, an expert (called by 
the defence) and a police expert (called by the 
Crown) testified in the voir dire. The judge only 
excised the BC Hydro reference and information 
about the specifics of the window coverings. 
However, he upheld the warrant on the basis of the 
remaining  record as amplified on review. The faint 
odour of marihuana, efforts to conceal the escape of 
light from the basement windows (consistent with a 
grow operation), the earlier detection of marihuana 
odour and evidence of the hydro consumption was 
sufficient to support reasonable grounds. The 
accused was convicted of producing  marihuana and 
possessing it for the purpose of trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed, submitting 
the search warrant should not have 
been upheld and the evidence 
ruled inadmissible under s. 24(2). 
The Crown, on the other hand, suggested that when 
the totality of the circumstances set out in the ITO, 
as amplified on review, was considered with 
common sense, there was sufficient information to 
establish a reasonable belief that went beyond mere 
suspicion.
The Court of Appeal first recognized the test for 
determining  whether a search warrant was properly 
issued. “The test on review is 
whether a justice of the peace, 
assessing  all the facts on a 
practical, non-technical and 
common sense basis, could have 
been sat is f ied there were 
reasonable grounds to believe 
marihuana would be found 
inside the residence,” said 
Justice MacKenzie. In this case, 
the Court of Appeal found the 
trial judge was correct in some 
aspects but made errors in 
others:
Odour – The trial judge’s finding  that the 
investigator detected the odour of vegetative 
marihuana as he walked past the  driveway at 
the accused’s 2.09 acre rural property was not 
unreasonable and open to her to make.
Power Consumption Comparison – The 
power consumption document for an average 
dwelling  in the area that was used to compare 
with the accused’s residence was unreliable. The 
officer did not say anything  about its reliability 
in the ITO and testified he took it from another 
member, “kind of a boilerplate.” 
The document referenced was 
not published by BC Hydro as 
stated in the  ITO and the officer 
knew nothing  about it, except 
what it said. Furthermore, the 
“ amp l i f i c a t i on” ev idence 
provided by the police expert 
went beyond the permissible 
boundaries of such evidence. 
“Amplification is not a means to 
adduce additional information 
so as to retroactively authorize a 
search that was not initially 
supported by reasonable grounds,” said Justice 
MacKenzie. Rather than the Crown re-
examining  an informant on matters arising  in 
cross-examination, the Crown offered rebuttal 
evidence by a different witness. Plus, even had 
this evidence been elicited from the investigator 
“The test on review is whether a 
justice of the peace, assessing all 
the facts on a practical, non-
technical and common sense 
basis, could have been satisfied 
there were reasonable grounds 
to believe marihuana would be 
found inside the residence.
x
What is Amplification?
When a reviewing Court assesses the sufficiency of a 
warrant application, it does not decide whether it 
would have issued the warrant, but must determine 
whether there was sufficient credible and reliable 
evidence to permit a justice of the peace to find 
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence had 
been committed and that evidence of that offence 
would be found at the specified time and place. In 
doing so, the reviewing court does not only review 
the ITO that was presented to the justice of the 
peace but may also hear “amplification”, or additional 
evidence, presented at the voir dire to correct minor 
errors in the ITO. Erroneous information included in 
the original  ITO will be excluded. Amplification 
evidence may correct good faith police errors in 
preparing the ITO and some minor, technical errors in 
drafting the affidavit, but not deliberate attempts to 
mislead the authorizing justice. Amplification 
evidence, however, cannot be adduced as a means 
for police to retroactively authorize a search warrant 
that was not initially supported by reasonable 
grounds. 
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in either cross-examination or re-examination, it 
would have exceeded proper amplification.
Window Covering  Facts and Opinion – In 
the ITO the investigator said that all eight of the 
windows facing  the road were covered from 
inside the  residence. However, at trial he 
admitted that he had an incomplete view as he 
was 75 metres away, seated in his police 
vehicle, using  binoculars and looking  through 
trees. He said he did not include this in the ITO 
but should have. He also agreed he did not 
notice two other large windows and one beside 
the door which were not covered (no coverings 
were found on them). When police executed the 
warrant they found some of the  upper windows 
open and uncovered. The Court of Appeal found 
the information about all the windows being 
covered was misleading: it suggested a  total 
blackout when that was not the case. The 
reference to the coverings of the eight windows 
at the front of the house to prevent the escape of 
light was removed from the ITO, along  with the 
opinion attaching to it.
Information on Past Investigations – This 
information, including  the prior smell of 
marihuana, did not contribute to reasonable 
grounds in the ITO. It was essentially disclosure.
Was the Search Warrant Valid?
With the power consumption comparison and 
window covering  facts and opinion excised, and the 
information on past investigations amounting  only to 
disclosure, all that remained was the “faint but 
definite  smell of vegetative marihuana.” It was 
transient and brief, described by Crown as a “whiff.” 
When taken alone, a “whiff” of marihuana would 
not be sufficient to sustain the search warrant. The 
search was therefore unlawful and breached s. 8 of 
the Charter. When considering  s. 24(2), the Court of 
Appeal excluded the evidence. Although the 
offences were serious and the evidence reliable and 
crucial to the Crown’s case, the Charter-infringing 
police conduct amounted to a serious intrusion. It 
involved a “hard entry” to a residence, a battering 
ram to “breach” the  back door and an arrest at 
gunpoint. The evidence was excluded.
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were set aside and acquittals were entered.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.cax
x
Hearsay and Reasonable Grounds 
In Voong, the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
commented on the use of hearsay in an officer’s 
reasonable grounds assessment. It said this:
It is quite true, as the Crown says, that hearsay 
evidence communicated from one officer to 
another may contribute to establishing 
reasonable grounds. The fact evidence is 
hearsay does not bar its use to form grounds for 
a search. The question is whether the hearsay 
has been shown to be reliable, considering 
whether it is compelling, the source of the 
hearsay credible, and whether the information 
was corroborated.  These factors do not form 
separate tests, but the “totality of the 
circumstances” must meet the standard of 
reasonableness.
But it is not enough that the information, 
although it may be reliable hearsay, is 
“available” to the police generally as a corporate 
body. Rather, the information must be within the 
knowledge of the Informant himself when he 
obtains the warrant.  In this case, it was not.
... “[T]he police officer who must have 
reasonable and probable grounds for believing a 
suspect is in possession of a controlled drug is 
the one who decides the suspect should be 
searched. That officer may or may not perform 
the actual search.  If another officer conducts the 
search, he or she is entitled to assume that the 
officer who ordered the search had reasonable 
and probable grounds for doing so....”.
Thus, the grounds to search must be held by the 
officer who makes the decision to search. By 
analogy in this case, the grounds to search had 
to be held by [affiant], who swore the ITO setting 
out his grounds and obtained the warrant.  
[references omitted, paras. 61–64]
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 OFFICER’S	 DOUBT	 ABOUT	 
IMPAIRMENT	 DID	 NOT	 
UNDERMINE	 CONVICTION
R. v. Wilson, 2013 SKCA 128
A citizen observed a truck being 
driven erratically. He called police, 
followed it and reported its progress. 
The vehicle eventually pulled into a 
parking  lot and stopped. The citizen 
continued down the street, made a U-turn but lost 
sight of the truck for a moment. When the police 
arrived shortly thereafter, they found the accused 
behind the wheel of the truck, seat belt fastened, 
brake lights on and engine running. The officer woke 
the accused, asked him to shut off the engine, step 
out and accompany her to the  patrol car. His walk 
was slow and deliberate and he had difficulty  with 
his coordination. When asked for his licence, the 
accused searched for his wallet but could not find it. 
The officer, however, could see a wallet in his 
pocket, removed it and retrieved the licence. She 
also smelled a “faint odour” of alcohol from the 
accused. He was arrested for impaired care and 
control, given his rights and a breath demand was 
made. 
During  questioning  the accused said he had a 
couple cans of beer earlier at his sister’s, a  block 
away. But he denied driving. He said he came out to 
the vehicle to listen to music, being  tired and under 
stress from work. The officer, began to doubt 
whether alcohol caused her concerns about the 
accused’s driving, so he made an approved 
screening  device demand. The accused blew a “fail.” 
This confirmed the officer’s earlier opinion and she 
followed through with the investigation, transporting 
the accused to the police station where he provided 
breath samples over the legal limit. As a result, 
charges of impaired operation and over 80mg% 
were laid.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found the off icer had 
reasonable grounds for the arrest and 
demand – both subject ively and 
objectively. However, the ASD demand 
was not made forthwith. It was done after the 
accused had already been arrested. The ASD test was 
excluded. As for the breathalyzer tests, they were not 
taken as soon as practicable. The judge found there 
was an unexplained inordinate delay. The certificate 
of analysis was also excluded. Thus, the accused was 
found not guilty on the over 80mg% charge. As for 
the impaired driving  offence, the accused was 
convicted. The judge was satisfied that the evidence 
of the citizen combined with the arresting  officer’s 
evidence (absent the test results)  was sufficient to 
prove guilt beyond a  reasonable doubt. He was 
fined $1,000 with a $150 victim surcharge and 
suspended from driving for one year.
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued, among  other 
grounds, that the trial judge failed to 
address evidence that was inconsistent 
with impairment. In his view, the arresting 
officer’s doubts about his impairment – which she 
addressed with the ASD –  should have raised a 
reasonable doubt in the judge’s mind as to his guilt. 
But the appeal judge disagreed stating, “The fact that 
[the officer] had a doubt does not necessarily 
translate  into a doubt within the judicial mind.” The 
trial judge had properly considered the  evidence – 
the nature of the accused’s driving, the physical 
indicia of impairment and the admission of alcohol 
consumption – in convicting. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused appealed again 
submitting, in part, that the trial 
judge erred by not having  a 
reasonable doubt as to his 
impairment. He emphasized the fact that, after the 
arrest, the officer doubted her own assessment of his 
impairment by alcohol so much so that she made an 
illegal ASD demand upon him. Since the officer 
herself had a reasonable doubt about his impairment 
before she obtained the ASD results or the results of 
the breath tests at the  police station, the trial judge 
should have had a reasonable doubt as well (since 
he was not allowed to consider those results). In was 
his contention that the trial judge erred by shifting 
the burden of proof to him to establish his 
innocence.  
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Justice Caldwell rejected the accused’s argument. 
“What [the accused’s] submission fails to recognise, 
however, is that his conviction on the impaired 
driving  charge pivots not on the judgment of the 
arresting  officer but rather on the weight of the 
whole  body of evidence before the trial judge, 
which cogently supports the conclusion that he 
operated a motor vehicle while his ability to do so 
was impaired by alcohol,” he said. “The trial judge 
was the trier of fact in this case and the views of the 
arresting  officer as to what part of the  evidence 
indicated did not preclude the  trial judge from 
making  findings of fact and drawing  inferences of 
fact on the basis of the whole of the evidence which 
was before  him. That is to say, I find no compelling 
reason to why the arresting  officer’s doubt in [the 
accused’s] impairment by alcohol at the time of 
arrest should require the trial judge to have doubt in 
[the accused’s] impairment by alcohol after he has 
heard all of the evidence of impairment and alcohol 
consumption adduced at trial.” The evidence of the 
concerned motorist and the arresting  officer, even 
without the ASD or Breathalyzer results, was 
sufficient. Justice Caldwell continued:
A conviction for impaired driving  will lie where 
there is sufficient evidence to conclude beyond 
a reasonable doubt that an accused has driven 
while his or her ability to operate a motor 
vehicle was impaired by alcohol or a drug. 
Here, the Crown had proven that [the accused] 
had admitted to having consumed alcohol, had 
driven aberrantly, and had exhibited deteriorated 
judgment or attention and a loss of motor co-
ordination or control. All of this rationally 
supports a finding that [the accused’s] ability to 
operate a motor vehicle was impaired by 
alcohol. [para. 41]
The trial judge considered the whole of the evidence 
(not including  the ASD or  breath tests)  and did not 
improperly shift the burden of proof to the accused. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
CHARTER	 TAINT	 MAY	 OR	 MAY	 
NOT	 BE	 CLEANSED:	 DEPENDS	 
ON	 CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Manchulenko, 2013 ONCA 543
After pulling  a vehicle over shortly 
before 4:00 am, a police officer 
formed the opinion the accused’s 
ability to operate the vehicle was 
impaired by alcohol. He was 
arrested for impaired driving, advised of his right to 
counsel and a formal demand for a  breath sample 
was made. The accused confirmed he understood 
what the officer had told him and declined to invoke 
his right to counsel. He accompanied the officer to 
the police station where he declined to call a  lawyer 
when asked by the officer in charge if he wished to 
do so. In the breathalyzer room, the qualified 
technician reiterated the accused’s right to counsel. 
This time, the accused said he wanted to call a 
lawyer. The qualified technician simply took the 
accused to the telephone room and left him there for 
less than a minute. The accused did not contact a 
lawyer, instead stating  “well, let’s get this over with.” 
He provided his first breath sample at 4:29 am. 
When he asked about the breathalyzer reading  and 
what he should do next, he was taken back to the 
telephone room so that he could speak with a 
lawyer. He was not told the  reading. He spoke to a 
lawyer, returned to the breath room and provided a 
second breath sample at 4:50 am. He was charged 
with impaired driving and over 80 mg%.
Ontario Court of Justice
Although the judge found there was no 
breach of the informational component of 
the Charter’s s. 10(b), he did rule there 
was a violation of the implementational 
component. Before taking  the breath sample, the 
qualified technician failed to tell him that the police 
had a duty to hold off until a reasonable opportunity 
to exercise his right to counsel was provided. In her 
view, when the accused changed his mind about 
speaking  to a lawyer, the police should have told 
him of his right to a reasonable opportunity to 
contact a lawyer and that police would not take any www.10-8.ca
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statements or require him to participate in any 
potentially  incriminating  process until he had had 
that reasonable  opportunity. As a result of the 
breach, the judge excluded the analysis of both 
breath samples under s. 24(2)  of the Charter. 
Although the breath analysis was reliable and 
important to the Crown’s case, the breach was 
serious and involved an intrusion into the accused’s 
privacy and bodily  integrity. The remaining  evidence 
- the observations of the arresting  officer, a videotape 
of the accused in the booking  room and the 
observation report of the  qualified technician – was 
insufficient to warrant a conviction. Both charges 
were dismissed.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The Crown challenged the trial judge’s 
rulings arguing  she erred in finding  a s. 
10(b) breach and in excluding  the  results 
of both breath tests. But the appeal judge 
disagreed and dismissed the Crown’s appeal. He 
held that the police did breach s. 10(b) by failing  to 
afford the accused a reasonable opportunity to 
exercise his right to counsel before administering  the 
first breath test and by failing  to hold off until the 
right had been exercised. As for the admissibility of 
the second breath sample, the appeal judge opined 
that the two breath samples could not be separated 
from each other. “Once there is a Charter breach 
and the accused was not afforded his s. 10(b) 
Charter rights, all the evidence from that point 
onward should be excluded,” he said. “If the 
fundamental right against self-incrimination is 
infringed, all the evidence gathered from that point 
onward is tainted and is subject to be excluded 
under a s. 24(2) Charter analysis.”
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown again contended that 
the appeal judge erred in agreeing 
that the results of both breath tests, 
especially the second one, should 
have been excluded. In the Crown’s view, the appeal 
judge failed to distinguish between the first and 
second samples, in light of the exercise of the right 
to counsel between the two, such that the second 
breath sample could be considered as separate or 
independent from the first. The Crown submitted 
there  was a “fresh start.” The accused exercised his s. 
10(b) rights and received legal advice  after the first 
sample but before the second such that the second 
sample was not “obtained in a manner that infringed 
or denied” his Charter rights. The accused, while 
acknowledging  the trial erred in failing  to rule 
separately on the admissibility of the second breath 
sample, nevertheless suggested he reached the 
correct conclusion. There was a temporal and 
contextual connection between the samples, making 
them part of the  same transaction or course of 
conduct which warranted exclusion.
Right to Counsel
Justice Watt, writing  the Court of Appeal’s decision, 
described the rights afforded under s. 10(b):
The purpose of the right to counsel is to allow a 
detainee not only to be informed of his rights 
and obligations under the law but, equally, if not 
more importantly, to obtain advice about how to 
exercise those rights.
Sect ion 10(b) of the Charter has two 
components. The first, the informational 
component, requires and ensures that the 
detainee is advised of his or her rights to 
counsel. The second, the implementational 
component, requires that the detainee be given a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise his or her 
right to counsel, should she or he decide to do 
so. Implicit in the implementational component 
is a duty on the police to hold off questioning  or 
requiring the detainee to participate in 
investigative procedures, or eliciting evidence 
until the detainee has a reasonable opportunity 
to consult counsel.
Th e d u t i e s o f t h e p o l i c e u n d e r t h e 
implementational component of s. 10(b), 
however, are not absolute. Unless the detainee 
invokes the right to counsel and is reasonably 
diligent in exercising it, the correlative duties of 
the police to provide a reasonable opportunity 
for the detainee to exercise the right, and to 
refrain from eliciting evidence, will either not 
arise in the first place or will be suspended.
When a detainee, diligent but unsuccessful in 
contacting counsel, changes his or her mind and 
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decides not to pursue contact with a lawyer, s. 
10(b) requires the police to explicitly inform the 
detainee of his or her right to a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel and of the police 
obligation to hold off in their questioning  or 
otherwise eliciting evidence until then. What 
amounts to reasonable diligence in the exercise 
of the right to contact counsel depends on the 
context, and requires a fact-specific inquiry into 
all the circumstances. [references omitted, paras. 
63-66]
 
Fresh Start - Cleansing a Charter Taint
Sometimes, when considered by itself, evidence 
appears to be free  from any contaminants that would 
render it inadmissible. However, when looking  at 
the evidence in context, it could be tainted by an 
earlier impediment to admissibility. For example, a 
confession may be sufficiently connected to an 
earlier involuntary confession that it too is 
considered involuntary. “The derived confessions 
rule excludes statements which, despite not being 
involuntary when considered alone, are sufficiently 
connected to an earlier involuntary  confession to be 
rendered involuntary and hence inadmissible,” said 
Justice Watt. “Each subsequent confession may be 
involuntary if the  tainting  features that disqualified 
the first continued to be present, or if the fact the 
first statement was made, was a substantial factor 
contributing  to the making  of the second or 
subsequent statement.”
In this case of s. 24(2), it only applies to evidence 
where  there  has been a proven Charter breach and 
the evidence sought to be admitted was “obtained in 
a manner” from the breach. This “nexus” between 
the Charter violation and the acquired evidence may 
be temporal, contextual, causal or a  combination of 
these. Sometimes police will try to insulate evidence 
from an earlier Charter breach by intervening  with 
Charter compliant conduct. Nevertheless, there is no 
per se or bright line rule that will automatically 
immunizes a Charter taint. Nor is there a rule that 
automatically mandates exclusion of all evidence 
that follows a Charter infringement regardless of 
attempts by police to cleanse the taint. Instead, a 
case-specific analysis is required.
In this case, the appeal judge adopted a rule that all 
evidence obtained after the s. 10(b)  infringement 
should be excluded. This was a mistake. He failed to 
undertake a case-specific  analysis of all the 
circumstances in determining  whether s. 24(2) was 
engaged. Further, the appeal judge did not consider 
whether the  Charter-compliant consultation 
preceding  the second sample was a “fresh start” 
thereby severing  the second breath test from the 
earlier s. 10(b)  breach and removing  it from s. 24(2)’s 
reach. Finally, if the second sample was tainted by 
the earlier breach, the lower court should have 
conducted a discrete, case-specific  s. 24(2) analysis 
in relation to the results of the analysis of the  second 
sample.
Justice Watt concluded several errors were made 
respecting  s. 24(2). The Crown’s appeal was allowed, 
the accused’s acquittals were set aside and a  new 
trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
JUDGE	 USED	 WRONG	 LENS	 TO	 
VIEW	 POLICE	 CONDUCT:
EVIDENCE	 EXCLUDED
R. v. Huynh, 2013 ABCA 416
 
A police officer saw a purple Dodge 
Dakota pick-up truck enter an out of 
the way and quiet parking  lot, 
perform a “button hook turn” and 
park. The  accused was driving  and 
there  was a female passenger seated behind the 
main bench seat. In less than three minutes, a male 
wearing  a dark hoody and jeans entered the 
passenger side of the truck, remained for less than a 
minute, got out, put his hands in the pouch of his 
hoody and left the scene. The officer, an 11 year 
veteran at the time, had experience for several years 
working  drug  investigations, including  undercover 
surveillance.  The officer believed he had witnessed 
a pre-arranged drug  transaction. He saw the men 
turn their bodies towards each other. Then, he saw 
them what appeared to be an exchange of some sort 
based on their arm and body movements while they 
were carrying  on a short discussion. However, the 
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officer did not see their hands nor did he observe 
any actual transfer of any item. After the vehicle 
went mobile, a uniformed officer in a marked police 
vehicle was directed to stop  the truck and arrest its 
occupants. A search of the truck incidental to arrest 
resulted in the seizure of cocaine and cash.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
During  a voir dire  the officer said, based 
on his experience, that he formed the 
opinion that a drug  transaction had taken 
place in the motor vehicle and that the 
driver was in possession of narcotics for the purpose 
of trafficking. However, despite this testimony, the 
Crown conceded there were ss. 8 (unreasonable 
search)  and 9 (arbitrary detention) Charter breaches. 
As for the evidence, the judge admitted it under s. 
24(2). He found the officer had acted in good faith. 
The officer held an honest subjective 
belief that the accused was involved in 
criminal activity. Using  the investigative 
detention criteria of a reasonable 
suspicion, the judge said it was a “close 
call” even though the Crown conceded 
the breaches. “On the whole of it, the 
impact of detaining  the [accused] in the 
parking  lot for a very short period of time 
while his motor vehicle  was searched for 
the purposes of securing  and preserving 
evidence, did not appear all that 
egregious,” said the judge. So, although 
the breach and its impact on the accused’s 
Charter-protected interests were serious, the very 
reliable  evidence which was essential to the Crown’s 
case outweighed its exclusion. The evidence was 
admitted and the accused was convicted. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused successfully appealed 
the trial judge’s s. 24(2)  decision to 
admit the evidence after he found 
ss. 8  and 9 Charter violations. The 
Court of Appeal held the trial judge was confused 
about the legal tests for detention and arrest. Rather 
than using  the reasonable grounds test for arrest, he 
ultimately used reasonable suspicion as it applied to 
detention. Nor did his reasons contain any  reference 
to the accused’s arrest being  unlawful. Had he used 
the proper test, he would not have found this case to 
be a “close call.” Further, his reasons reflecting  the 
seriousness of the Charter violation and its impact 
on the accused were limited to the police detaining 
him, not arresting  him. “The trial judge mistakenly 
proceeded to consider only the law of unlawful 
detention when assessing  the breaches under s. 24
(2),” said Chief Justice Fraser for the Court of Appeal. 
“In other words, the trial judge  did not properly 
consider the seriousness of the unlawful arrest.”
Since the judge erred in the applicable principles or 
rules of law, his s. 24(2)  determination, which would 
usually be afforded deference, was assessed anew. 
First, the unlawful arrest and unreasonable search 
were serious Charter breaches that favoured 
exclusion. Second, the accused was not merely 
detained but was arrested and his vehicle searched. 
“He had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his vehicle, albeit at a reduced 
level from the privacy to be expected in 
one’s home,” said Chief Justice Fraser. 
“The impact was serious and likewise 
militates in favour of exclusion.” Third, 
although the evidence was reliable and 
essential to the Crown’s case (which 
favoured admission), this should not 
overwhelm the s. 24(2)  analysis and 
render the other considerations favouring 
exclusion meaningless. “Not only did the 
trial judge minimize the seriousness of the 
Charter breaches by considering  them 
only  through the investigative detention lens, he  also 
overemphasized the only  factor weighing  in favour 
of admission.” After balancing  the three  s. 24(2) 
factors, the evidence was excluded, the accused’s 
appeal allowed and an acquittal entered.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
Editor’s note: Additional case facts taken from R. v. 
Huynh, 2012 ABQB 378.
 Note-able	 Quote
“Not the cry, but the flight of a wild duck, 
leads the flock to fly and follow.” - 
Chinese Proverb
“He had a 
reasonable 
expectation of 
privacy in his 
vehicle, albeit at 
a reduced level 
from the privacy 
to be expected 
in one’s home.”
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Intelligence Theories and Applications
A survey course that introduces the student 
to the discipline of intelligence and provides 
the student with an understanding of how 
intelligence systems function, how they fit 
within the policymaking systems of free 
societies, and how they are managed and 
controlled. The course will integrate 
intelligence theory with the methodology 
and processes that evolved over time to 
assist the intelligence professional. The 
course will develop in the student a range 
of advanced research and thinking skills 
fundamental to the intelligence analysis 
process.
Intelligence Communications
The skill most appreciated by 
the intelligence consumer is the 
ability to communicate, briefly 
and effectively, the results of 
detailed analytic work. This 
course, through repetitive 
application of a focused set of 
skills to a body of information of 
constantly increasing 
complexity, is designed to 
prepare intelligence analysts to 
deliver a variety of intelligence 
products in both written and oral 
formats.
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Topics include: drug/terrorism/other 
intelligence issues, advanced 
analytic techniques (including 
strategic analysis, predicative 
intelligence etc.), collection 
management, intelligence sources, 
management theory (large 
organizations), attacking criminal 
organizations, crisis management, 
negotiation techniques, strategic 
planning, local/regional updates 
and briefing techniques.
Specialized Courses
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foundational courses)
Intelligence Analysis Tactical Criminal Analysis
Competitive Intelligence 
This course explores the business processes involved in 
providing foreknowledge of the competitive environment; the 
prelude to action and decision. The course focuses on 
supporting decisions with predictive insights derived from 
intelligence gathering practices and methodologies used in the 
private sector. Lectures, discussions, and projects focus on the 
desires and expectations of business decision-makers to gain 
first-mover advantage and act more quickly than the 
competition.
Analyzing Financial Crimes
This course examines the nature and scope of financial crimes 
and many of the tools used by law enforcement in the 
preparation of a financial case. Included in this course is a 
detailed treatment of the following: laws which serve to aid in 
the detection and prosecution of these crimes, the types of 
business records available, types of bank records available, an 
examination of offshore business and banking operations, and 
the collection and analysis of this information, with emphasis 
placed on Net Worth and Expenditure Analysis. In addition, 
special treatment is given to the detection and prosecution of 
money laundering, various types of money laundering 
schemes, and the relationship of money laundering to 
terrorism.
Tactical Criminal Intelligence
This course is an introduction to law enforcement 
terminology, practices, concepts, analysis, and 
intelligence. The course will introduce the student to 
the discipline of crime analysis and law enforcement 
intelligence through the study of the intelligence 
cycle and the intelligence determinants. The role and 
responsibilities of an analyst within each sub-topic 
will be addressed. Additionally, the utilization of 
analytical software will be introduced.
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence 
The course reviews the key requirements for 
intelligence in law enforcement and homeland 
security. The course focuses the use of advanced 
analytic methodologies to analyze structured and 
unstructured law enforcement data produced by all 
source collection. Students will apply these 
concepts, using a variety of tools, to develop 
descriptive, explanatory, and estimative products 
and briefings for decision-makers in the field.
